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ABSTRACT
Acquisitive prescription, a broader concept than adverse
possession, has been adopted in at least 177 jurisdictions, and the
doctrine dates back to Roman law. This Article first surveys the
wide variety of acquisitive prescription laws in the world, and then
examines their merits. Contrary to many prior works, this Article
argues that the most justifiable form of acquisitive prescription is
one that awards ownership only to those who register (or record)
their ownership (or title) in good faith, but where, for technical
reasons, the conveyance turns out to be invalid. The requirement of
possession is redundant, even undesirable, once good faith and
registration of ownership (or title) are accounted for. Possessionbased acquisitive prescription—no matter whether possessors are in
good faith or bad faith—cannot be justified in countries with wellfunctioning registries if the possessor does not have title.
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Possession-based acquisitive prescription can only be justified in
countries with dysfunctional registries because possession-based
acquisitive prescription increases the cost of ascertaining title and
discourages ex ante voluntary transactions.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys and analyzes a peculiar property doctrine
maintained around the world. It is called “acquisitive prescription”1
in the civil law world,2 whereas it is called “adverse possession” in
common law countries. It is peculiar, at least in the case of adverse
possession (a sub-type of acquisitive prescription in the scheme of
this Article), because adverse possessors do not have to pay
“erstwhile owners”3 to acquire ownership—by definition, there are
no valid sale contracts between them; erstwhile owners and adverse
possessors may not even know each other’s identity or existence
until litigation is initiated. Acquisitive prescription (which will be
used as the umbrella term for reasons explained below) is
exceptional in private law because ownership changes hands
without the consent of the erstwhile owners. This practice goes
against the general policy in favor of voluntary transactions.4
What are the justifications for 177 of the 203 surveyed
jurisdictions in the world to maintain acquisitive prescription in
modern times? Is path dependence from Roman law (called
usucapio) to blame? China’s new civil code, enacted in May 2020,
1
Prescription, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, refers to “[t]he effect of
the lapse of time in creating and destroying rights.” Prescription, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Acquisitive prescription thus means acquiring rights
(here, property rights) after a certain period of time.
2
For instance, the Quebec Civil Code (Art. 2917) and the Louisiana Civil Code
(Art. 3446) use this term. Civil Code of Québec, R.S.Q. art 2917 (Can.); L A. CIV. CODE
art. 3446 (1982).
3
This Article follows the draft Restatement of the Law Fourth, Property, in
calling the original owner whose land has been occupied by a possessor for a long
period of time the “erstwhile owner,” even though in some illustrations the owner
would not lose ownership. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROPERTY § 1.2.2.1 (Am.
L. Inst., Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2019). Please be advised that the Restatement of
the Law Fourth, Property is ongoing and the cited sections and notes in this Article
have not been approved by ALI members yet. This caveat applies to all references
to the draft Restatement of the Law Fourth, Property, in this Article.
4
But see Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 1095, 1143–44 (2007) (explaining and justifying the re-distributive value
created by property outlaws such as adverse possessors); Gregory S. Alexander, The
Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 789–90
(2009) (echoing Peñalver & Katyal’s argument). Cf. Laura Underkuffler, Open,
Notorious, and Continuously Occupied: A Claim for Adverse Possession, CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y: ISSUE SPOTTER (Nov. 16, 2011) http://jlpp.org/blogzine/opennotorious-and-continuously-occupied-a-claim-for-adverse-possession/
[https://perma.cc/M8RF-ESLU] (contrasting homeless adverse possessors and
strategic adverse possessors).
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notably contains no stipulations regarding acquisitive
prescription—a conscious decision by its drafters.5 Is this another
ill-advised innovation in private law with “Chinese characteristics”
or a wise trailblazing decision?
This Article is the most thorough survey of acquisitive
prescription law in the literature thus far.6 It contributes to better
understanding of a legal doctrine that has existed for two millennia.
As to policy, this Article reconsiders the justifications offered for
acquisitive prescription. Many prior studies in English focus on the
adverse possession doctrine in American common law. Their
analytical findings, therefore, are not readily applicable to
acquisitive prescription doctrines in other countries.
This Article adopts an economic framework that aims to
maximize overall economic efficiency, which, in property law, is
measured by the size of the social benefits derived from allocating
resources in a certain way relative to the institution costs7 required
to realize such an allocation. An economically more desirable
allocation of a resource assigns the resource in question to the party
who values it more (the “higher valuer”). Allocative efficiency (in
the sense of Pareto optimality) is achieved when such allocation
cannot be improved. 8 When a new policy improves resource
allocation over the status quo, it is called higher allocative efficiency
(in the sense of Kaldor-Hicks superiority). 9 Allocative efficiency,
however, pays attention only to allocation benefits, but an efficiency
criterion should pay attention to costs as well. A legal system that
always perfectly assigns resources to their highest valuers could be
very expensive. Allocative efficiency is not worth pursuing if the
information and transaction costs (the two components of
institution cost) incurred are prohibitively high. Thus, the most
efficient (in the Kaldor-Hicks sense) property regime is one that
WEIXING SHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 223 (2008).
For another large-scale comparative project on adverse possession law, see
generally Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Carmine Guerriero & Zhenxing Huang, The
Property-Contract Balance, 172 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 40 (2016)
(examining data from 126 jurisdictions and analyzing an imprtant trade-off
between protecting property rights and enhancing reliance on contracts).
7
Many people may think that “institutional costs” reads better. I follow
Steven Cheung, who invented this term, in using institution costs. See Steven N.S.
Cheung, The Transaction Costs Paradigm, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 514, 515 (1998).
8 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 14 (6th ed. 2012).
9 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 91–92 (1983); Lee Anne
Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1494 (2013); Henry
E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1786–87 (2004).
5

6
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creates the greatest net social benefit: social allocation benefits
minus institution costs.
This Article argues that acquisitive prescription that is based
mostly on possession but not on registration (called adverse
possession in this article), as is found in most civil and common law
countries, cannot be justified on efficiency grounds in modern
times, 10 regardless of whether the legal system has either a
registration-of-right or recording system for land rights.11 The more
efficient regime should require an attempted transfer of ownership
(that turns out to be defective), the registration of such a title (or
ownership), and good faith. Lawmakers should update their
antiquated legal doctrine or cite a non-economic justification for
acquisitive prescription. In particular, American common law, in
this regard, is largely inefficient.
While in the United States adverse possession is often used to
resolve boundary disputes (sometimes called building
encroachment), 12 this type of dispute is better left to a separate

10 But see generally EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY
OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF
OWNERSHIP (2010) (justifying adverse possession on non-efficiency grounds).
11
For comparative economic analysis of the recording system versus the
registration-of-right system, see generally Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, The
Choice of Titling System in Land, 48 J.L. & ECON. 709 (2005) (analyzing the relative
costs of registration and recording titling systems).
12 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 156 (3d ed. 2010). For American cases
that do not involve boundary disputes, see generally, for example, Howard v. Kunto,
477 P.2d 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (involving a defendant whose property deed
described the adjacent lot but who was ultimately awarded title to the property
after establishing continuity of possession); Paine v. Sexton, 37 N.E.3d 1103 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs were entitled to thirty-six acres of woodland
under adverse possession after extensive commercial use despite their failure to
enclose the property or reduce it to cultivation). I thank Eduardo Peñalver for
bringing these two cases to my attention. Howard v. Kunto is a particularly
interesting case, as due to systemic surveying errors, a number of landowners in
the neighborhood held deeds that describe their neighbors’ land. Technically
speaking, the possessors did not have even apparent title, though they had valid
title to an adjacent plot. This case, I would argue, does not defeat my argument that
as a general matter (in terms of law) purely possession-based acquisitive
prescription is not warranted, but it reminds us of the import of having equity (as
meta-law) to resolve outlier cases like Howard v. Kunto. For equity as meta-law, see
generally Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021) (arguing
that equity permeates fields of law and performs an important interstitial function).
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doctrine 13 —as fifty-two jurisdictions in the world do 14 —that
incorporates considerations specific to boundary disputes. Building
encroachment is thus deferred for another article. With boundary
disputes excluded, the scope of the adverse possession doctrine
regarding good-faith possessors is limited only to situations
involving color of title (defective written instrument).15
This Article is structured as follows: Part II provides separate
typologies for registration-based and possession-based acquisitive
prescription regimes. Part III explores the economic justifications
for the several main types. Part IV concludes.
II. A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
This Part surveys acquisitive prescription law around the
world. 16 Acquisitive prescription regimes are divided into two
13 See generally Luke Meier, A Contextual Approach to Claim of Right in Adverse
Possession Cases: On Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, Bad Faith, and Mistaken Boundaries, 19
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 47, 51 (2015) (treating mistaken boundary encroaching as a
separate category); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse
Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 162–64 (1995) (noting the rent-seeking
problem in boundary encroachment cases).
14 See Matteo Rizzolli, Building Encroachments, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 661 (2009);
Yun-chien Chang, Crossing the Line: A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Building
Encroachment (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
15
The most efficient doctrinal design for boundary disputes is different from
the design for other adverse possession disputes, for example, color of title. For
countries that already have two separate doctrines, there is no obstacle in
developing an efficient mechanism for each. In the common law, where color of
title and boundary disputes are mixed under one doctrine, there can hardly be any
mechanism that simultaneously deals perfectly with the two distinct types of
disputes efficiently. This Article chooses to focus on exploring the most efficient
mechanism for resolving adverse possession disputes rather than claims arising
from boundary disputes.
16
This Article ignores the technical differences listed below. First, after the
statute of limitations runs, some jurisdictions like Quebec (Art. 2918) and Taiwan
(Art. 769) require a judicial application, see Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64,
art.
2918
(Can.); MÍNFǍ
( 民 法 )
[CIVIL CODE]
art.
769,
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0000001
[https://perma.cc/PL3B-SC22] (Taiwan), whereas in some countries, adverse
possessors can automatically acquire ownership after the prescription period—for
instance, South Africa and some states in the United States. See C.G. VAN DER
MERWE, M.J. DE WAAL & D.L. CAREY MILLER, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN SOUTH
AFRICA 230 (2002). Second, in many countries, possessors acquire ownership, while
in some countries, erstwhile owners can no longer recover possession of their land,
but possessors do not acquire ownership. See, e.g., J.E. Jansen, Thieves and Squatters:
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major types:
registration-based 17 and possession-based.
Conceptually, the two types are mutually exclusive, but a country,
such as Germany, can contain both types in its legal system. Almost
all registration-based acquisitive prescription regimes also require
possession, while some possession-based acquisitive prescription
jurisdictions require registration of possession, which means the fact of
someone’s possession is reflected in the registration records.
Registration of possession is different from registration of
ownership or title for registration-based systems. If a country
requires registration of ownership or title, even if it also requires
possession, this article classifies it as registration-based. Thus, in my
methodology, no possession-based system requires registration of
ownership or title, but a registration-based system may (and in fact
often does) require possession.

Acquisitive and Extinctive Prescription in European Property Law, 1 EUR. PROP. L. J. 153
(2012); DAVID HAYTON & PAUL MATTHEWS, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN ENGLAND
AND WALES 46–47 (2007); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession,
89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2422 n.15 (2001). The European Draft Common Frame of
Reference (DCFR) VIII.–4:301(1), to prevent a gap in ownership, stipulates that
“[u]pon expiry of the period required for the acquisition of ownership by
continuous possession the original owner loses and the owner-possessor acquires
ownership.” STUDY GRP. ON A EUR. CIV. CODE & RSCH. GRP. ON EC PRIV. L.,
PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 4235 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009),
http://www.transformacje.pl/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/european-privatelaw_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9QP-7K5Z]. That is, unless a possessor acquires
ownership, an original owner does not lose ownership. Note that the DCFR covers
only movable properties. The RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROPERTY § 1.2.2.1, 1.2.2.2
(Am. L. Inst., Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2019) and the accompanying comments
emphasize that the statute of limitations and the requirements for adverse
possession are aligned. That is, if any of the requirements for adverse possession
are not met, the statute does not run. If the statute of limitations does not run,
adverse possession will have no chance to apply.
17
In this Article, the “registration” in “registration-based” includes the two
major types of real estate ownership information depository: registration of rights
(including the Torrens version) and recording (elsewhere sometimes called
recordation or registration of documents). To avoid confusion, the term
“registration” in this article refers to both the registration-of-right system and the
recording system, and the term “registry” refers to offices that handle registration
under both systems.
A registration-of-right system “is always done in the form of a realfolium, i.e.,
ordered by the land registered.” By contrast, a recording system “is normally done
in the form of a personalfolium, i.e., ordered by the name of the respective owner.”
CHRISTOPH U. SCHMID & CHRISTIAN HERTEL, REAL PROPERTY LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 32 (2005). The personalfolium is called the grantor-grantee
index in the United States. Some jurisdictions in the United States also have a track
index.
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Adverse possession should not be conflated with the property
doctrines covered in this Article because possession is a
precondition for adverse possession, as its name suggests. In my
survey, at least one country has adopted a registration-based
acquisitive prescription that does not require possession at all. And
this article will further challenge the role of possession in acquisitive
prescription. The adversity requirement in adverse possession is
defined as nonpermissive use, 18 but many countries require, for
instance, a conveyance (that turns out to be defective) from the
erstwhile owner qua seller to the buyer qua acquisitive prescription
claimant (more on this later) that purportedly gives title. In this
situation, the buyer’s use is permissive, at least before the seller finds
out about the defect and re-claims ownership. The buyer in this
situation does not, strictly speaking, possess adversely. This Article
uses the term adverse possession as an alternative label for
possession-based jurisdictions that have no title requirement at all.
The concept of (just) title is complicated and worthy of further
explanation. A good start to understanding it is through the lens of
the Louisiana Civil Code Article 3483: “A just title is a juridical act,
such as a sale, exchange, or donation, sufficient to transfer ownership or
another real right. The act must be written, valid in form, and filed for
registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
immovable is situated.” 19 Argentina Civil Code Article 1902 also
provides a useful definition:
Just title for acquisitive prescription is the one having as a
purpose the transfer of a principal real right that is exercised
by possession, with the formal requirements required for its
validity, when its grantor is not capable or does not have authority
therefor.
The good faith required in a possessory relationship consists
in not having known, nor to have been able to know, the lack of
right thereto.
When recordable things are involved, good faith requires the
previous examination of the registry documentation and

18
19

See SINGER, supra note 12, at 149.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 (1982) (emphasis added).
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proof, as well as performing the pertinent acts of verification
established in the respective special regime.20
The gist of (just) title, therefore, is that an acquisitive prescription
claimant must have been a transferee in a prior conveyance. The
claimant comes to claim acquisitive prescription because it turns out
that a legal defect exists in the real estate conveyance. For example,
a seller, due to temporary mental illness, did not have the legal
capacity to transfer her ownership to a transferee; alternatively, a
middleman made a mistake and as a result an ownership transfer
did not become effective in the eyes of the law. In the United States
common law, a rule dealing with similar concerns is called “color
of title”21 or “apparent title,” according to Black’s Law Dictionary. 22
In this article, I opt to use “apparent title” because “color of title” is
not intuitive to civil lawyers and “just title” may be misunderstood
as a normative concept. 23 Apparent title conveys the idea that a
transferee, based on a prior conveyance, succession, or legacy, has
reason to believe that she is (entitled to be) the owner, though it
turns out her ownership is void or voidable. As analyzed below,
apparent title and possession, in addition to knowledge (good or
bad faith), are the key elements in understanding the similarities and
variances in acquisitive prescription around the world. For
simplicity, below I often use “with(out) title” to mean “with(out)
apparent title.”
In most countries, there are acquisitive prescription regimes for
both real and personal property. This Article focuses on those for
20
JULIO ROMAÑACH, JR., CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF ARGENTINA:
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND INDEX 336 (2015) (emphasis
added); CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 1902 (Arg.).
Professors Aristi & Imbernón point out that:

[j]ust title should be understood as a contract allowing the transfer of
property or any other limited real right, that is to say, on the basis of an
ordinary usucapio, there must be a contractual title that a priori is adequate
to allow the acquisition . . . . the just title may be a revocable, rescindable, or
relatively null one . . . .
RAFAEL SÁNCHEZ ARISTI & NIEVES MORALEJO IMBERNÓN, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN
SPAIN 110 (2013) (emphasis added).
21
See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 171-72 (3d ed. 2017) (explaining color of title as existing when “a person
has some document—usually a deed, will, or judicial decree—that purports to
convey title but does not in fact do so because of some legal defect.”).
22
Apparent Title, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
23
The Draft Common Frame of Reference uses the term “putative title.” See
STUDY GRP. ON A EUR. CIV. CODE & RSCH. GRP. ON EC PRIV. L., supra note 16, at 4192.
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immovables only. In some countries, such as Taiwan (art. 66),
acquisitive prescription rules for land and buildings may differ. 24
For simplicity, this article only summarizes rules for land.
Oftentimes, within a jurisdiction, a possessor can prescribe both
ownership and limited property rights.25 This Article focuses only
on acquisitive prescription of land ownership.26
a. Registration-Based Acquisitive Prescription
Thirty-six studied jurisdictions have registration-based
acquisitive prescription. Three elements are critical: registration of
apparent ownership or apparent title; knowledge (good faith or bad
faith); and possession (to avoid repetition, title and ownership
below means apparent title and apparent ownership). To be
MÍNFǍ (民法) [Civil Code] art. 66 (Taiwan).
Eighty-two of the 172 jurisdictions (forty-eight percent) with possessionbased acquisitive prescription for ownership also have rules regarding acquisitive
prescription for limited property rights. Only one jurisdiction that does not have
acquisitive prescription for ownership has rules regarding acquisitive prescription
for limited property rights—Pakistan—for prescriptive easement. See Easements
Act, 1882, No. 5 of 1882, PAK. CODE, § 15.
26
For simplicity, this Article will not discuss acquisitive prescription
regarding inheritance claims and waqf. Qatar (Art. 968) and Afghanistan (Art.
2780) have possession-based prescriptive acquisition regarding inheritance claims
for 33 years. See Qanun raqm (22) lisanat 2004 bi'iisdar alqanun almadanii [Law no.
(22) of 2004 Regarding Promulgating the Civil Code] art. 968,
https://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wpcontent/uploads/library/Qatar_2004_Promulgating_Civil_Code_Law_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EP5Z-J6HZ] (Qatar); Madani qanun ([ )ﻣﺪﻧﻲ قاﻧونCivil Law],
OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 353, art. 2280 (Afg.), translated in CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF AFGHANISTAN 295 (Afg. Legal Educ. Project trans., 2014). Qatar (Art. 967), Jordan
(Art. 1183), Libya (Art. 974), and United Arab Emirates (Art. 1319) have special
stipulations for waqf (prescription period being thirty or thirty-three years, much
longer than that for ordinary objects). See Qanun raqm (22) lisanat 2004 bi'iisdar
alqanun almadanii [Law no. (22) of 2004 Regarding Promulgating the Civil Code]
art. 967 (Qatar); HISHAM R. HASHEM, THE JORDAN CIVIL CODE OF MOSLEM
JURISPRUDENCE 179 (1990); LYBIAN CODE CIVIL [LIBYAN CIVIL CODE], Jarida alRasmiyah, art. 974, 13 Feb. 1954 (Libya); Qanun almueamalat almadaniat lidawlat
al'iimarat alearabiat almutahida ([ )قاﻧون المعاﻣﻼت المﺪﻧية لﺪولة اﻹﻣارات العربية المتحﺪةFederal
Law No. 5 of 1985 On the Civil Transactions Law of the United Arab Emirates State]
art.
1319,
https://elaws.moj.gov.ae/UAE-MOJ_LCEn/00_CIVIL%20TRANSACTIONS%20AND%20PROCEDURES/UAE-LCEn_1985-12-15_00005_Kait.html?val=EL1 [https://perma.cc/9SPT-3Z79] (U.A.E.).
For an introduction to the concept of waqf, see Tang Hang Wu, From Waqf, Ancestor
Worship to the Rise of the Global Trust: A History of the Use of the Trust as a Vehicle for
Wealth Transfer in Singapore, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2263, 2277-81 (2018).
24

25
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counted as registration-based, a jurisdiction must require
registration of either title or ownership. Registration of merely
possession, under my scheme, does not count as registration-based.
The difference between registration of title and registration of
ownership is that, under my scheme, the latter requires that an
acquisitive prescription claimant has been registered as the owner
for a certain period of time, while the former requires that the cause
of registration of ownership—the title—has to be the underlying
legal instrument. That is, under registration of ownership, a random
registration mistake may anoint a registered owner a de jure one
after the prescription period runs.27
The difference between registration of title and registration of
ownership may arise due to the difference in types of registries used.
All countries identified as requiring registration of ownership in

27
In a 1971 case, the German Federal Court of Justice explicitly held that the
registrant does not have to explain how she becomes the nominal owner. BGH,
Oct.
29,
1971,
V
ZR
122/68,
prinz.law
(Ger.)
https://www.prinz.law/urteile/bgh/V_ZR_122-68
[https://perma.cc/A4JH4TXV]; CHRISTIAN PICKER & SEBASTIAN HERRLER, J. VON STAUDINGERS, KOMMENTAR
ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN BUCH
3: SACHENRECHT §§ 889–902, at § 900 Rn. 14 (2019).
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Table 1 appear to have a registration-of-right system, whereas
many (though not all) countries identified as requiring registration
of title in
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Table 1 have a recording system. What type of registration
system is used in a country is often not specified in the civil code.
My coding of the registration system is thus unreliable.
Unfortunately, The World Bank Doing Business Report (discussed
below) also does not ask the registry type question directly.
I code a country as requiring registration of title or ownership
based on the language in the acquisitive prescription doctrine. For
instance, Spain, and the Latin American countries that emulate
Spain’s acquisitive prescription rules, are coded as registrationbased, and, in particular, requiring registration of title, despite the
fact that Spain adopts a registration-of-right system. This is because
the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 1949) stipulates that:
Ordinary prescription of ownership or rights in rem to the
detriment of a third party shall not take place against a title
registered in the Property Registry, unless it is pursuant to
another title which has also been registered, and the time shall
begin to run from registration of the latter.28
Panama (Art. 1686), Colombia (Art. 2526), Chile (Art. 2505),
Puerto Rico (Art. 1849), and Equatorial Guinea (Art. 1949), among
others, have the same stipulation. 29 Costa Rica (Art. 861) and
Nicaragua (Art. 898) have the same stipulation with a different
expression.30

See CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1949 (emphasis added).
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1686 (Pan.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.]
[CIVIL CODE] art. 2526 (Colom.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2505
(Chile); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5270 (1930) (P.R.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL
CODE] art. 1949 (Eq. Guinea).
30
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 861 (Costa Rica); CÓDIGO CIVIL DE
LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA] tit. V ch.
III art. 898, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 11 Dec. 2019 (Nicar.).
28
29
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Table 1 uses knowledge and types of registration to divide all
jurisdictions with a registration-based system into four types.
Almost all jurisdictions require possession. Each type is further
explained below.
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Table 1: Registration-Based Acquisitive Prescription: Two
Dimensions

Good
and Bad
Knowledge Faith
Both
Allowed

Good
Faith
Only

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

Types of Registration
Registration of
Registration of
Apparent Title
Apparent
Ownership
(1)
(2)
Portugal and its
Estonia, Georgia,
former colonies: Germany, Sweden,
Angola, Brazil,
and Turkmenistan.
Cape Verde,
Guinea-Bissau,
Macau,
Mozambique,
Sao Tome e
Principe, and
Timor-Leste.
(3)
Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador,
Equatorial
Guinea, Finland,
Honduras, Italy,
Nicaragua,
Panama, Puerto
Rico, Romania,
Scotland, Spain.

(4)
Azerbaijan,
Liechtenstein,
Slovenia, South
Korea, Switzerland,
and Turkey.
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Cell (3)
Spain (Arts. 1949 and 1957),31 Equatorial Guinea (Arts. 1949 and
1957), and five Latin American countries—Argentina (Art. 1898),
Honduras (Art. 2286), Nicaragua (Arts. 888 and 898), Panama (Art.
1694), and Puerto Rico (Art. 1857)32—have a very similar rule. In
their ordinary acquisitive prescription regimes, four elements—title,
registration of title, good faith, and possession—are all required.
This is registration-based acquisitive prescription. In addition, a
possessor who is either bad-faith or without title has to possess for
a longer time than the ordinary acquisitive prescription regime
requires. This is possession-based acquisitive prescription under
my scheme.
Italy (Art. 1159I) is close to the Spanish model in requiring title,
its registration, and good faith, but Article 1159 of the Italian Civil
Code does not explicitly require possession.33 Nonetheless, because
Article 1159 is located in the code chapter on possession, and both
the preceding and the following articles (Arts. 1158 and Arts. 1159bis) on acquisitive prescription rules require possession, the
possession requirement should arguably be implied in Art. 1159 to
warrant Italy’s inclusion in cell (3).34
Chile (Arts. 2505, 2507 and 2510), Ecuador (Arts. 2406 and 2410),
and Colombia (Arts. 2526, 2529 and 2531) develop a slightly
different regime.35 Their registration-based acquisitive prescription
law also requires all four elements—title, registration of title,36 good
faith, and possession. Their “extra-ordinary prescription” (as it is
31
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1949, 1957. The relevant stipulations
in Spain have been implicitly replaced by the Mortgage Act. See S.T.S., Jan. 21, 2014
(No. 841/2013) (Spain) https://vlex.es/vid/usucapion-tabulas-regimen-aplicable494106578 [https://perma.cc/6GLK-LEZR]. I thank Professor Vanessa Casado
Pérez for this observation.
32
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1949 (Eq. Guinea); CÓDIGO CIVIL
Y COMERCIAL [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 1898 (Arg.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD.
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2286 (Hond.); CÓDIGO CIVIL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA
[CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA] tit. V ch. II art. 888; ch. III art. 898,;
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1694 (Pan.); P.R. LAWS ANN. Tit. 31 § 5270
(1930) (P.R.).
33
CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1159, 1159I (It.).
34
CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1158, 1160 (It.).
35
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 2505, 2507, 2510 (Chile); CÓDIGO
CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 2406, 2410 (Ecuador); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL
CODE] arts. 2526, 2529, 2531 (Colom.).
36
Note here that while Ecuador has a registration-of-right system, its civil
code uses the term “registration of title.”
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called) is possession-based. Those without registered title, good or
bad faith,37 may acquire ownership by possession-based acquisitive
prescription (ten years in Chile and Colombia; fifteen years in
Ecuador).
Other countries that fall into cell (3) include Bolivia (Art. 134),
Costa Rica (Arts. 853, 860 and 861), Finland (Code of Real Estate, Ch.
13, Sec. 10),38 Romania (Arts. 930–931),39 and Scotland (Prescription
and Limitation Act 1973, § 1).40
Cell (1)
Registration-based acquisitive prescription in Portugal (Art.
1294) and its former colonies—Brazil (Art. 1242 Sole Paragraph),41
37
In Ecuador (Art. 2410), a custodian is presumed to be acting in bad-faith
and thus unqualified to acquire ownership by prescription, unless custodians can
establish themselves as possessors by meeting the following two requirements: (1)
erstwhile owners cannot prove that possessors during the prescription period
recognize the former’s ownership; and (2) possessors have possessed continuously
without violence. CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2410.
38

A person whose title to real estate has been registered and who thereafter
has possessed the real estate for ten years may keep the real estate, if he at
the time of acquisition did not know nor should have known that the real
estate had been taken from the rightful titleholder. If no action for a better
right to the real estate is brought during this time, the rightful titleholder
shall forfeit his right to demand the return of the real estate.
MAAKAARI [CODE OF REAL ESTATE] 540/1995, § 10 (Fin.), translated in NB: Unofficial
translation,
Code
of
Real
Estate,
MINISTRY
OF
JUSTICE,
FIN.,
https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1995/en19950540_19980964.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8D8Z-Z7CQ].
39
See CATALIN GABRIEL STANESCU, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN ROMANIA 117
(2017).
40
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 134 (Bol.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD.
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 853, 860, 861 (Costa Rica); MAAKAARI [CODE OF REAL ESTATE]
540/1995, § 10 (Fin.); CODUL CIVIL AL ROMÂNIEI [CIVIL CODE OF ROMANIA] No.
287/2009, arts. 930-31; Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, c. 52, § 1
(Scot.).
41
Brazil Civil Code Art. 1242 Sole Paragraph:
The term provided in this article shall be of five years if the immovable
had been acquired by onerous title, based on the records of the
corresponding registry, and thereafter cancelled, when the possessors had
established their dwelling therein, or made investments of social and economic
interest in the property.
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Macau (Art. 1220), and Timor-Leste (Art. 1214)—require title,
registration, and possession.42 A possessor who is good-faith (ten
years), as compared to bad-faith (fifteen years), saves five years in
the prescription period.
Cell (2)
Registration-based legal systems that do not require title and its
registration appear to be those affected by German property law.43
Germany (Art. 900) emphasizes an acquisitive prescription
claimant’s being registered as the owner and being in possession.44
Georgia (Art. 167), Estonia (Law of Property Art. 123(1)), South
Korea (Art. 245), and Turkmenistan (Art. 188) follow this model.45
In the registration-based system in Sweden (Land Code Chapter
16 Section 1), which adopts a registration-of-right system with only
the opposability effect, a shorter, ten-year prescription period
applies if a possessor in good faith with title and has complete
registration of ownership, whereas a longer, twenty-year

JULIO ROMAÑACH JR., CIVIL CODE OF BRAZIL TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH: WITH AN
INTRODUCTION, INDEX AND GLOSSARY OF SELECTED BRAZILIAN CIVIL LAW TERMS 230
(3d ed. 2015) (emphasis added); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1242.
42
CÓDIGO CIVIL [Civil Code] art. 1294, https://dre.pt/dre/legislacaoconsolidada/decreto-lei/1966-34509075 (last visited Feb. 26, 2022) (Port.); Código
Civil [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1242 (Braz.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 1220
(Mac.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 1214 (Timor-Leste).
43
See Yun-chien Chang, Nuno Garoupa & Martin T. Wells, Drawing the Legal
Family Tree: An Empirical Comparative Study of 170 Dimensions of Property Law in 129
Jurisdictions, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 231, 273 (2021) (explaining that Estonia and South
Korea belong to the German legal family).
44
The German Civil Code at Art. 900: “A person who is registered as the
owner of a plot of land in the Land Register without having acquired ownership
acquires ownership if the registration has existed for thirty years and he has had
the plot of land in proprietary possession in this period.” Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
[BGB] [Civil Code], § 900, para. 1, sentence 1, https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html [https://perma.cc/7BAE-LRE4].
45
SAKARTVELOS SAMOKALAKO K’ODEKSI (საქართველოს სამოქალაქო კოდექსი)
[CIVIL CODE] art. 167 http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/geo193847ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HVH-B7YZ] (Geor.); ASJAÕIGUSSEADUS [LAW OF PROPERTY ACT]
RIIGI TEATAJA [RT] I 1993, 39, 590, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/108072014007
[https://perma.cc/BWT4-FC7D] (Est.); Minbeob [Civil Act] art. 245 (S. Kor.);
GRAZHDANSKIY KODEKS TURKMENISTANA [CIVIL CODE OF TURKMENISTAN] art. 188
(1998), https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/330139 [https://perma.cc/4ZV7-38XM]
(Turkm.).
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prescription period applies if a possessor either lacks good faith or
is without title and has complete registration of ownership.46
Cell (4)
Slovenia, Switzerland (Art. 661), Liechtenstein (Sachenrecht Art.
42), and Turkey (Art. 712) are close to the German model but require
that possessors be good-faith. 47
Azerbaijan (Art. 178.5) is idiosyncratic in that it is close to the
Swiss model but does not explicitly require that an acquisitive
prescription claimant be in possession.48 Azerbaijan (and perhaps
Italy) is the rare country that does not require possession.
b. Possession-Based Acquisitive Prescription
Costa Rica, Georgia, Finland,49 Sweden, and Turkmenistan have
registration-based
but
not
possession-based
acquisitive
prescription. Another thirty-one countries listed in

46
JORDABALK [JB] [LAND CODE] 16:1 (Swed.). See also Dirk Westermann &
Reinhard Herrmann, Schweden, in SACHENRECHT IN EUROPA: SYSTEMATISCHE
EINFÜHRUNGEN UND GESETZESTEXTE 493, 532, 597 (Christian Von Bar ed., 1999); ULF
JENSEN,
SWEDEN
25
(2010),
https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/
ResearchThemes/EuropeanPrivateLaw/RealPropertyProject/Sweden.PDF
[https://perma.cc/4CWU-X9FP].
47
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE
[CC] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 661 (Switz.); SACHENRECHT (SR)
[Property law] vom 31. art. 42 (Liech.); MEDINI KANUNU [CIVIL LAW] art. 712,
https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.4721.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GSP4-JZKX] (Turk.). For debate on this doctrine in Slovenia,
see JERCA KRAMBERGER ŠKERL & ANA VLAHEK, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN SLOVENIA
136–37 (1st ed. 2010).
48
AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLIKASININ MÜLKI MƏCƏLLƏSI [CIVIL CODE OF THE
REPUBLIC
OF
AZERBAIJAN]
art.
178.5,
http://ask.org.az/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/The-Civil-Code-of-the-Republic-of-Azerbaijan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UDD9-99WW] (Azer.).
49
See ERKKI J. HOLLO, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN FINLAND 146 (2019).
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Table 1 have both registration-based and possession-based
acquisitive prescription.
Ninety-four jurisdictions have only
possession-based acquisitive prescription, whereas twenty-six
studied jurisdictions (notably China,50 Singapore,51 and Pakistan,52
among others) have neither. See

50
See Yun-chien Chang, Property Law with Chinese Characteristics: An Economic
and Comparative Analysis, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 345, 361-62 (2012).
51
See ALVIN SEE, MAN YIP & YIHAN GOH, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN
SINGAPORE 297 (2018).
52
In Pakistan, adverse possession of ownership is against the principles of
Islam. A plea of adverse possession has been declared against the injunctions of
Islam by the judgment of Hon’ble Shariat Appellate Bench. Maqbool Ahmad v.
Gov’t of Pakistan, (1991) SCMR 2063 (Pak.).
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Figure 1.

Table 2: Typology of Possession-based Acquisitive Prescription
Knowledge

Apparent Title Requirement

Total

Reduces Spain et al.
Not
prescription and Chile et
required Required
al.*
period

Good Faith
Only
Good Faith <
Bad Faith
Good Faith =
Bad Faith
Total
Note:

(1)
24
(5)
17
(9)
34
75

(2)
10
(6)
0
(10)
0
10

(3)
5
(7)
0
(11)
27
32

(4)
0
(8)
0
(12)
10
10

39
17
71
127

* See Part II.A for explanations of the laws in Spain, Chile, and other
countries with similar laws.

Unlike in a registration-based system, where apparent title is
either required or not, in a possession-based system, apparent title
could be: required, prescription-period-shortening, or not required.
The American common law is a prime example. Fifteen states
require color of title as an element of adverse possession, but most
do not—although in some states, the statute of limitations becomes
shorter with color of title. 53 Table 2 shows the several functions
apparent title serves in possession-based acquisitive prescription
(again, to avoid repetition, title below means apparent title).
More specifically, of the twenty countries in cell (11) of Table 2,
twenty-six allow possessors with title to enjoy a shorter prescription
period only when they are good-faith. They include Algeria (Art.
828), Greece (Arts. 1041 and 1045), Iraq (Art. 1158), Jordan (Art.
1182), and the Philippines (Arts. 1117 and 1137) to name a few. 54
53
The fifteen states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROPERTY §
1.2.2.3 (Am. L. Inst., Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2019) (Reporters’ Note).
54
CODE CIVIL ALGERIENNE [CIVIL CODE OF ALGERIA] art. 828 (Alg.); ASTIKOS
KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] 3:1041, 3:1045 (Greece); Civil Code of 1953, art. 1158
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That is, good-faith possessors with title enjoy a shorter prescription
period, while bad-faith possessors with title, bad-faith possessors
without title, and good-faith possessors without title face the same
longer prescription period. Hungary (Art. 5:45) is an outlier because
it does not explicitly require possessors who have title to be goodfaith.55 That is, possessors with title, good- and bad-faith alike, enjoy
a shorter prescription period, while possessors without title, goodand bad-faith alike, have to wait it out for a longer time.
The five countries in cell (3) of Table 2, Indonesia (Art. 1963), Iraq
(Art. 1158), Macedonia (Law on Ownership and Other Real Rights
Art. 124), Serbia (The Law on Basis of Ownership and Proprietary
Relations Art. 28), and Suriname (Art. 1984), allow only good-faith
possessors to prescriptively acquire ownership, and those with title
enjoy a shorter prescription period.56
Cell (2) of Table 2 includes Guatemala (Arts. 620 and 633), Latvia
(Arts. 999 and 1024), and Scotland (Prescription and Limitation Act
1973, Art. 2).57 In addition, the original French Civil Code (Art. 2265)
allows only good-faith possessors with title to prescriptively acquire
ownership. 58 This was transplanted by Burkina Faso (Art. 2265),
Comoros (Art. 2265), Ivory Coast (Art. 2265), Luxembourg (Art.
2265), Togo (Art. 2265), Mauritius (Art. 2263), and Niger (Art.
2265).59 Belgium (Art. 2262) made a different choice, allowing not
only good-faith possessors but also bad-faith possessors to

(Iraq); CIVIL CODE, Book III, Title V, Chapter 2, § 1117, 1137, Rep. Act 386, as
amended (Phil.). See HASHEM, supra note 26, for a translation of Jordan Art. 1182. .
55
POLGÁRI TÖRVÉNYKÖNYV [PTK] [CIVIL CODE] 5:45 (Hung.).
56
KITAB UNDANG-UNDANG HUKUM PERDATA [BOOK OF CIVIL LAW] art. 1963
(Indon.); Civil Code of 1953, art. 1158 (Iraq); ZAKON ZA SOPSTVENOST I DRUGI STVARNI
PRAVA [Law on Ownership and Other Real Rights] art. 124 (Maced.); Z AKON O
OSNOVAMA SVOJINSKOPRAVNIH ODNOSA [THE LAW ON THE BASIS OF OWNERSHIP AND
PROPRIETARY
RELATIONS]
art.
28
https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_osnovama_svojinskopravnih_odnosa
.html [https://perma.cc/V5HD-LR89] (Serb.); BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [CIVIL CODE]
art. 1984 (Surin.). Note that the Serbian law and the Macedonian law, at least in
their English translation, are very similar in wording and structure.
57
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] arts. 620, 633 (Guat.); CIVILIKUMS [CIVIL LAW]
arts. 999, 1024, https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=90224 [https://perma.cc/5SLG983Z] (Lat.); Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, c. 52, § 1 (Scot.).
58
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2265 (Fr.).
59
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2265 (Burk. Faso); CODE CIV. [C. CIV.]
[CIVIL CODE] art. 2265 (Comoros); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2265 (Ivory
Coast); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2265 (Lux.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL
CODE] art. 2265 (Togo); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2263 (Mauritius); CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2265 (Niger).
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prescriptively acquire after thirty years.60 The current French Civil
Code (Arts. 2272–2275) also changed to allow both good- and badfaith possessors to acquire ownership, but a possessor in good faith
and with title acquires ownership in ten years. 61 So France now
belongs to cell (11) of Table 2.
Cell (5) of Table 2 contains sixteen countries that require a longer
prescription period for bad-faith possessors. Notably, several
countries among them require the registration of possession. Portugal
(Art. 1295) and its former colonies—for instance Timor-Leste (Art.
1215) and Macau (Art. 1220)—treat registration of possession as a
precondition for possession-based acquisitive prescription, and
registration of possession is a judicial procedure, before which a
claimant has to be in possession for at least five years.62 Another
model is Mexico (Art. 1152), where registration of possession
appears to be an independent way to acquisitive prescription. 63
Also included in this group are Bulgaria (Ownership Act Art. 79),
Cambodia (Art. 162), Japan (Art. 162), Poland (Art. 172), Taiwan
(Arts. 769 and 770), and Ukraine (Art. 344). 64 Professor Richard
Epstein advocates a two-tiered statute of limitations that requires

60
C.CIV. (Belg.), art. 2262 (“Toutes les actions réelles sont prescrites par trente
ans, sans que celui qui allègue cette prescription soit obligé d’en rapporter un titre,
ou qu’on puisse lui opposer l’exception déduite de la mauvaise foi.”).
61
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 2272-75 (Fr.).
62
CÓDIGO CIVIL [Civil Code] art. 1294 (Port.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art.
1295 (Timor-Leste); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 1220 (Mac.).
63

Immovable things are prescribed: I. In five years, when the person
possesses as owner, in good faith, peacefully, continuously, and publicly.
II. In five years, when the immovables have been the object of a possession
recordation. III. In ten years, when they are possessed in bad faith, if the
possession is in the status of an owner, peaceful, continuous, and public.
CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL [CC], art. 1152, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 31-081928, última reformas DOF 24-12-2013, translated in JULIO ROMAÑACH, JR., FEDERAL
CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO: TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND
INDEX 160 (2003).
64
Zakon za sobstvenostta [Ownership Act], DARZHAVEN VESTNIK [DV] [STATE
GAZETTE] No. 92 of 16 Nov. 1951, art. 79 (Bulg.); KRAMR DTH BB VENEI ( កមរដប េវណី)
[CIVIL CODE] art. 162 (Cambodia); MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 162 (Japan); Kodeks
cywilny [K.c.] [Civil Code], DZ.U. 1964 NR 16, POZ. 93, art. 172 (Pol.); MÍNFǍ (民法)
[Civil Code] art. 769-70 (Taiwan); TSYVILNYI KODEKS UKRAYINY (Цивільний кодекс)
[CIVIL CODE OF UKRAINE] art. 344, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/435-15
[https://perma.cc/S2L7-RLD9] (Ukr.).
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longer prescription periods for bad-faith claimants. 65 This
mechanism has been realized in these countries.
The thirty-three jurisdictions contained in cell (9) of Table 2, by
contrast, treat good- and bad-faith possessors equally in terms of
prescription period. The equal treatment means these jurisdictions
effectively omit the requirement regarding knowledge. That is, the
distinction between good faith and bad faith, unlike in the many
other jurisdictions summarized above, is not embedded in the
acquisitive prescription doctrine. These jurisdictions include, e.g.,
California (Civil Code Art. 100766 and Code of Civil Procedure Arts.
31867 and 32568), Germany (Art. 927), Italy (Art. 1158), Kuwait (Art.
935), New Zealand, 69 Qatar (Art. 966), Quebec (Art. 2918), 70
Romania, 71 Slovakia (Art. 134), South Africa (Section 1 of the

65
See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 685-89 (1986); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse
Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights,
64 WASH. U.L.Q. 723, 733-34 (1986) (discussing and agreeing with the merit of
Epstein’s proposal).
66
“Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as
sufficient to bar any action for the recovery of the property confers a title thereto,
denominated a title by prescription, which is sufficient against all . . . .” CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1007 (West 2021).
67
“No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the
possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his
ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the property in
question, within five years before the commencement of the action.” CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 318 (West 2021).
68

In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the
provision of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of five years continuously,
and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have timely
paid all state, county, or municipal taxes that have been levied and
assessed upon the land for the period of five years during which the land
has been occupied and claimed.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 325 (West 2021).
69
See GORDON WILLIAMS, PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 73–74
(2011).
70
Note that regarding immovables, Quebec Civil Code Art. 2918 recognizes
“[a] person who has for 10 years possessed an immovable as its owner . . . ,” while
regarding movables, the next article, Art. 2919, stipulates that “[t]he possessor in
good faith of movable property acquires the ownership of it . . . “ (emphasis added).
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, arts 2918, 2919.
71
See STANESCU, supra note 39, at 116–17 (explicitly pointing out that
possessors need not be in good faith).
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Prescription Act 68 of 1969),72 South Korea (Art. 245), Switzerland
(Art. 662), Tajikistan (Art. 258), and Thailand (Art. 1382).73 Among
them, notably, New York (Real Property Actions and Proceedings
Law Art. 501) stipulates that:
For the purposes of this article:
1. Adverse possessor. A person or entity is an “adverse
possessor” of real property when the person or entity
occupies real property of another person or entity with or
without knowledge of the other's superior ownership rights, in
a manner that would give the owner a cause of action for
ejectment.
2. Acquisition of title. An adverse possessor gains title to
the occupied real property upon the expiration of the statute
of limitations for an action to recover real property pursuant
to subdivision (a) of section two hundred twelve of the civil
practice law and rules, provided that the occupancy, as
described in sections five hundred twelve and five hundred
twenty-two of this article, has been adverse, under claim of
right, open and notorious, continuous, exclusive, and actual.
3. Claim of right. A claim of right means a reasonable
basis for the belief that the property belongs to the adverse
possessor or property owner, as the case may be.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, claim of
right shall not be required if the owner or owners of the real
property throughout the statutory period cannot be
ascertained in the records of the county clerk, or the register
72
See VAN DER MERWE, DE WAAL & MILLER, supra note 16, at 231 (noting that
just title and good faith have never been required).
73
For the remaining statutes, see Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code],
§ 927 (Ger.); CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1158 (It.); ALQANUN ALMADANIU
ALKUAYTIU ([ )القاﻧون المﺪﻧﻲ الكويتﻲCIVIL LAW] No. 67 of 1980, art. 935 (Kuwait); Qanun
raqm (22) lisanat 2004 bi'iisdar alqanun almadanii [Law no. (22) of 2004 Regarding
Promulgating the Civil Code] art. 967 (Qatar); OBČIANSKY ZÁKONNÍK [CIVIL CODE],
Zàkon c. 40/1963 Zb., art. 134 (Slovk.); Minbeob [Civil Act] art. 245 (S. Kor.);
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE [CC] [Civil
Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 210, art. 662 (Switz.); KODEKSI GRAƵDANII ÇUMHURII
TOÇIKISTON (КОДЕКСИ ГРАЖДАНИИ ҶУМҲУРИИ ТОҶИКИСТОН) [CIVIL CODE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN] ch. 12 art. 258, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/237357
(last visited Feb. 26, 2022); PRAMWL KḌHM
̄ ĀYPHÆ̀NG LÆA PHĀṆICHY̒
(ประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์) [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE] [CCC] bk. 3 art. 1382
(Thai.). Note that Thailand (Art. 1383) has another complication that may require
bad-faith possessors to possess for a longer period of time before being qualified as
owners. Id. art. 1383.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss2/2

2022]

Adverse Possession Laws in 203 Jurisdictions

401

of the county, of the county where such real property is
situated, and located by reasonable means.74
This means that, in New York, if record owners cannot be
ascertained in the registry, possessors can be bad faith, as claim of
right is not required. If record owners can be ascertained, possessors
must have a claim of right. In the case of New York, a claim of right
is like a combination of good faith and color of title.75 This is not
entirely the same as the California law quoted above (Civil Code
Art. 1007 and Code of Civil Procedure Arts. 318 and 325).
Cell (1) of Table 2 includes twenty-four jurisdictions, e.g.,
Armenia (Art. 187), Austria (Art. 1468), Belarus (Art. 235),
Kazakhstan (Art. 240), Kyrgyzstan (Art. 265), the Netherlands (Book
3, Art. 99), Russia (Art. 234), Slovenia, 76 Turkey (Art. 713),
Uzbekistan (Art. 187), and Vietnam (Art. 247). 77 In these
jurisdictions, only good-faith possessors may acquire ownership by
prescription, but titles are not required.
III. MODERN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Part II surveys the law on the books around the world. The
prevalence of acquisitive prescription is not hard to explain. It has
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 501 (2021) (emphasis added).
This Article agrees with the draft Restatement of the Law (Fourth) on
Property, that a few existing concepts related to adverse possession could be
overlapping and that they have been often manipulated to reach the right results in
particular cases. It is thus important to streamline the preconditions for adverse
possession.
76
See ŠKERL & VLAHEK, supra note 47, at 135.
77
K’AGHAK’ATS’IAKAN ORENSGIRK’ (ՔԱՂԱՔԱՑԻԱԿԱՆ ՕՐԵՆՍԳԻՐՔ) [CIVIL
CODE]
art.
187,
https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=74658
[https://perma.cc/E7SS-ZZA9] (Arm.); ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
[ABGB]
[CIVIL
CODE]
§
1468
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Ges
etzesnummer=10001622 [https://perma.cc/9Q2B-YQYP] (Austria); RAMADZIANSKI
KODEKS RESPUBLIKI BIELRUŚ (Грамадзянскі кодэкс Рэспублікі Беларусь) [CIVIL
CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS] No. 218-Z, art. 235; QAZAQSTAN RESPWBLÏKASINIÑ
AZAMATTIQ KODESKI (Қазақстан Республикасының Азаматтық кодексі) [CIVIL
CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] No. 241-VI, art. 240; KIRGIZ RESPUBLIKASININ
GRAJDANDIK KODEKSI (Кыргыз Республикасынын Граждандык кодекси) [CIVIL
CODE OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC] art. 265 (Kyrg.); Art. 3:99 para. 1 BW. (Neth.);
GRAZHDANSKIĬ KODEKS ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 234 (Russ.);
MEDINI KANUNU [CIVIL LAW] art. 713 (Turk.); O'zbekiston Respublikasining
Fuqarolik kodeksi [Civil Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan] art. 187; B Ộ LUẬT DÂN
SỰ [CIVIL CODE], No. 91/2015/QH13, ch. II art. 247 (Viet.).
74

75
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been a venerated doctrine since the Roman law, received by
developed European countries when they started to build modern
private law systems. The doctrine was later inherited by other
countries through colonization or voluntary imitation. Lawmakers
have kept or borrowed it because, to this day, a civil dispute may
occasionally be resolved through the acquisitive prescription
doctrine.
But how can acquisitive prescription be justified in modern
times?78 Adverse possession may have been efficient in pre-modern
times, but in the twenty-first century—the age of GPS, block-chain,
Google Earth, etc.—acquisitive prescription must be justified, if
possible, on new grounds. This part is divided into several sections,
each dealing with a particular type of acquisitive prescription
regime explored in Part II.
In the following sections, when I refer to a system that requires
title, I mean either (1) a country with a recording system that
requires property deeds that convey ownership to be recorded or (2)
a country with a registration-of-right system that requires a claimant
of acquisitive prescription to be registered as an owner due to a
conveyance of ownership. This title requirement is meant to broadly
include other legitimate sources of ownership, such as through
inheritance, but to exclude parties who record forged deeds or who
have been registered as owners due to pure mistake by registries. I
define title in this way due to my view that acquisitive prescription
in modern times is better reserved and used to redress hardship
caused by defects in an otherwise legitimate transfer of ownership,
but not to give irrelevant persons a free pass to ownership.
a. Registration-Based, with Good Faith and Apparent Title
Third-party purchaser protection is one, but not the main,
function of registration-based acquisitive prescription. Protecting
registration-based acquisitive prescription could reduce third-party
information costs. If purchasers check the information in registries
but are still bound by unregistered adverse interests, registration78
For a review of how scholars defended the adverse possession doctrine in
the United States from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, see
generally John A. Lovett, Disseisin, Doubt, and Debate: Adverse Possession Scholarship
in the United States (1881–1986), 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1 (2017). For discussion of the
adverse possession doctrine in the specific context of Louisiana Civil Code, see John
A. Lovett, Precarious Possession, 77 LA. L. REV. 617 (2017).
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based acquisitive prescription could give purchasers a fresh start
after the statute of limitations runs. Nonetheless, given that the
limitation period is usually quite long, purchasers can hardly count
on registration-based acquisitive prescription; thus, they still need
to expend information costs. In this regard, much more useful is the
public faith principle, under which purchasers relying on
information contained in a registry regarding who has property
rights and how a piece of land is encumbered by adverse interests
will be protected against holders of unregistered adverse property
interests.79
Yet, the public faith principle is not universally adopted.80 In the
United States, for instance, purchasers are bound by adverse
interests that they have actual or constructive notice of. A recorded
deed is only one way to give constructive notice. An adverse interest
that can be discovered with “reasonable inquiries” or “standard due
diligence”81 still binds subsequent purchasers. Purchasers, or the
professionals they hire, may have reasonably attempted to discover
such adverse interests but fail. Registration-based acquisitive
prescription is a long shot to have a fresh start, but it is better than
nothing for purchasers.
The registration-based acquisitive prescription regime is better
justified in its protection of nominal owners against the party from
whom ownership is conveyed (here, a nominal owner is better
described as a “second party,” not a “third party,” because a dispute
arises between a pair of transacting parties, like a buyer and a seller).
Especially in jurisdictions where real estate registration or recording
is “constitutive,” 82 buyers, ex ante, are usually aware of the
importance of having their names entered in the registry. Buyers
often do not have expertise to verify whether all aspects of the
79
For the public faith principle, see SJEF VAN ERP & BRAM AKKERMANS, CASES,
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON PROPERTY LAW 869 (2012). The public faith principle
regarding real properties is the functional equivalent of the good faith purchase
doctrine regarding personal properties—in fact, countries like China (Art. 311)
merge them into one doctrine. Mínfǎ (民法) [Civil Law] (promulgated by Nat’l
People’s Cong., May 28, 2020), art. 311.
80
See Yun-chien Chang, Wealth Transfer Laws in 153 Jurisdictions: An Empirical
Comparative Law Approach, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1915, 1932 (2018).
81
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROPERTY § 5.4.3.2 (Am. L. Inst., Preliminary
Draft No. 6, 2019).
82
If registration is constitutive, the transfer of ownership in land will only be
completed with registration. See SCHMID & HERTEL, supra note 17, at 33. The
registration-of-right system is often a de facto precondition for a constitutive effect.
See Chang, supra note 80, at 1925.
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transaction are sound, but they can usually discern by common
sense whether their names are in the registry book. A registry in a
constitutive system usually issues an ownership certificate to the
registered owner. 83 If buyers can never rely on the official
ownership certificate or registration records as a definitive sign that
the sale has been consummated, transaction costs of real estate
conveyance will increase significantly.84 This function of protecting
a second party is different from that of protecting a third party,
because, unlike in the latter, it does not concern the inaccuracy of
information regarding property rights in the registries, but rather
defects that arise typically in a conveyance.
If this is indeed the case, why not make registration of ownership
an immediate cure for any transactional defects? That is, why not
set the statute of limitations for good faith, with-title, registrationbased acquisitive prescription at zero days? In a jurisdiction with a
well-functioning registration-of-right system, a seller in a land sale
must be the registered owner (and very often the actual owner). A
conveyance by a self-proclaimed owner, whose name is not in the
registry, to anyone will be rejected by registries. The most likely
scenario in which this regime is applicable appears to be that a seller
in a deal lacks the legal capacity or authority to sell, or a deed is not
properly acknowledged by a notary. Here, a prescription period of
zero days would entirely defeat the point of making the conveyance
void or voidable in the first place. At zero days, a buyer may not
have relied on the fact of being the new owner, whereas a seller or
her representative does not have an opportunity to redress the
problem. For instance, a textbook example would be that a seller
becomes temporarily mentally ill and the contract she makes is void,
making the buyer’s title only an apparent one. A prescription period
of zero days would render the stipulations regarding legal capacity
and authority useless.
While zero days is not enough time, several decades is too much
to protect registered owners. Lawmakers have to weigh two
considerations, but the balance chosen by the studied jurisdictions
83
Registries in eight out of the fifteen jurisdictions with available World Bank
data, see infra Table 4, and with this acquisitive prescription regime, however, do
not deliver legally binding documents that prove ownership. This does not
decrease transaction and information costs. This feature of their registries suggests
that this acquisitive prescription regime is not the best fit in these jurisdictions.
84
Good faith registrants must return the land before the prescription period
runs. Depending on the contents of other doctrines, these registrants may or may
not be compensated for improvements made. If not, the prospect of losing
investment value may lead to underinvestment in the land.
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strikes me as too long. The minimal 85 prescription periods
stipulated by the sixteen jurisdictions with good-faith only, withtitle, registration-based acquisitive prescription are five years (five
jurisdictions) and ten years (eleven jurisdictions). If any party is at
fault, it is not buyers, as they are good-faith, i.e., the law already
considers them as not questioning the validity of title for good
reasons. Buyers have engaged in a genuine transaction and gone
through the salient registration procedure. By contrast, sellers
convey their ownership without legal capacity or authority.
Sometimes, sellers may do so knowingly; sometimes, as in the case
of mental illness, sellers are not at fault either. No studied
jurisdiction varies the prescription period by whether sellers are at
fault, whether third parties on the sellers’ side are affected, or
whether sellers receive reasonable consideration (such as market
value).
Long acquisitive prescription periods are problematic also
because good-faith registrants may sell “too early” and fail to meet
the prescription requirement. Suppose a good-faith registrant has
sold the thing in question after, say, three years of being registered
as the owner. At the time, the statute of limitations has not run. The
erstwhile owner finds out about the title defect after the statute of
limitations would have run, say twelve years after the defect took
place. When the erstwhile owner sues the good-faith registrant for
unjust enrichment, 86 the latter cannot draw on the acquisitive
prescription doctrine as a defense, as the registrant has not been
85
Prescription periods could be inflated by other factors. Here the minimal
length is used. One such factor is whether an erstwhile owner is absent. The
original French Civil Code (Art. 2265) stipulates that

[a] person who acquires an immovable in good faith and under a just title
prescribes ownership of it by ten years, where the true owner lives on the
territory of the court of appeal within whose limits the immovable is
situated; and by twenty years, where he is domiciled outside of the said
territory.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2265. This was transplanted by former French
colonies. See supra note 59. In addition, Spain (arts. 1957–58), Ecuador (Art. 2408),
Colombia (Art. 2529), El Salvador (Art. 2247), among others, picked up this absentee
owner rule. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1957-58 (Spain); CÓDIGO CIVIL
[CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 2408 (Ecuador); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE]
art. 2529 (Colom.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2247 (El Sal.).
86
A successful unjust enrichment claim essentially gets the erstwhile owner
the difference between the higher prices the registrant received from the third party
and the usually lower prices the registrant had paid. In jurisdictions with the public
faith doctrine, the erstwhile owner cannot re-claim landownership when good-faith
third parties have acquired land from registered owners.
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registered as the owner for a long enough time. This may suggest
that in countries with registration-based acquisitive prescription, the
rule better hinges on extinctive prescription instead of acquisitive
prescription—erstwhile owners cannot claim against good-faith
registrants after a certain number of years.
Nonetheless, even when the law has switched focus from how
much time the good-faith registrant is registered as the owner to
how much time has elapsed since the erstwhile owner was not
registered as the owner, good-faith registrants still will not be
protected if the acquisitive prescription doctrine continues to
require possession. Suppose the law were changed to prescribe
extinctive prescription after ten years. The first purchaser, with
apparent title, sells to the second purchaser after three years.87 An
additional nine years afterwards, the erstwhile owner sues the first
purchaser for unjust enrichment. The first purchaser cannot draw
on the protection afforded by the acquisitive prescription doctrine
because she has been in possession for at most three years. As a
result, the first purchaser must disgorge the presumably higher
price (paid to her by the second purchaser) through an unjust
enrichment action brought by the erstwhile owner. The ex-post
disgorgement is simply a redistribution of wealth and is irrelevant
to
efficiency.
Nonetheless,
ex
ante,
good-faith
purchasers/registrants have incentives to increase verification
efforts to reduce the probability of losing their profits, or to withhold
sales before the statute of limitations runs. The additional
verification and waiting create social waste88—by definition, being
good-faith means having conducted efficient verification, so
additional verification is inefficient; and waiting hinders resources
flowing to higher and better use.
If this is considered a normatively undesirable result, there are
three possible solutions. First, the prescription period should be
much shortened, as argued above. In this scenario, the prescription
87
As Benito Arruñada and his co-authors point out, a distinctive feature of
property law is that it involves sequential exchange. When thinking about property
law, one has to go beyond a two-party setting and take into account a transacting
third party. See Benito Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange: The Forgotten
Limits of Private Contract, 13 J. INST. ECON. 753 (2017); Benito Arruñada, Giorgio
Zanarone & Nuno Garoupa, Property Rights in Sequential Exchange, 35 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 127 (2019).
88
Note that the logic here does not apply to possession-based acquisitive
prescription, as possessors are not able to sell their occupied land before becoming
owners, whereas, before the legal defect is exposed by the erstwhile owner,
registrants are the (nominal) owner and can transfer their property rights.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss2/2

2022]

Adverse Possession Laws in 203 Jurisdictions

407

could still be acquisitive prescription and the possession
requirement may not inflict much harm and arguably bring some
social benefits occasionally.
Second, the law should recognize reverse tacking. One hundred
and seven studied jurisdictions recognize tacking of possession, but
none appear to allow reverse tacking. Tacking means that
subsequent possessors can combine the possession period of
previous possessors in calculating the needed prescription period.89
Reverse tacking means that previous possessors can combine the
possession period of subsequent possessors. For the first purchaser
in the aforementioned hypothetical example, acquisitive
prescription would be a valid defense against the original seller if
reverse tacking is allowed. Here, as under the first solution,
possession can still be required.
Third, the law should not require possession in registrationbased acquisitive prescription. As described above, only Azerbaijan
(and perhaps Italy) does not require possession, but what goals does
possession serve in a registration-based acquisitive prescription
regime? If decreasing genuine buyers’ transaction costs is sufficient
to justify this regime in economic terms, the possession requirement
incurs unnecessary social costs in verification and waiting.
The problem is whether the social costs are justified by the
benefit brought by the possession requirement. The best argument
for social benefit is as follows: if neither the original seller nor the
purchaser with apparent title possesses the land, but a third person
possesses the land, allowing the purchaser to acquire ownership via
prescription does not necessarily enable her to use the land.
Requiring possession ensures that the party with the apparent title
will use the land, thus increasing efficiency.
That said, I still view the expected social benefits of the
possession requirement as small. First, in the above scenario,
keeping the land in the non-possessory original seller’s hands does
not enable him to use it, either. Eventually, the actual possessor may
acquire ownership via the possession-based regime.
Second, though the concept of possession varies in intension and
extension across jurisdictions, 90 it is conceivable that many goodfaith registrants under most definitions of possession will still fulfill
Tacking is one of the key issues in Howard v. Kunto, see supra note 12.
See Yun-chien Chang, The Problematic Concept of Possession in DCFR: Lessons
from Law and Economics of Possession, 5 EUR. J. PROP. L. 4 (2016); Yun-chien Chang,
The Economy of Concept and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 103
(Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015).
89
90
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the continuous possession requirement when they are the registered
owners. Put differently, good-faith registrants, believing that they
are the true owners, will possess anyway. Yet in cases where goodfaith registrants have, say, sporadic possession, they will not be
entitled to prescribe ownership. The registrant’s case is strongest
when no one currently possesses the land.
In sum, title-required, good-faith, registration-based acquisitive
prescription serves an important function of reducing transaction
costs on the buyer’s side. Nonetheless, two fault lines persist. First,
a lengthy prescription period does not seem to strike the right
balance and may consequently fail to achieve the goal of saving
transaction costs, by imposing a lot of risk on good-faith registrants.
Second, the possession requirement appears to create more social
costs than social benefits. The possession requirement, thus, should
be taken out from the registration-based regime.
All jurisdictions presumably would prefer to reduce transaction
costs to facilitate voluntary exchanges. In those with registration-ofright systems, a title-required, good-faith, registration-based
acquisitive prescription doctrine can reduce transaction costs. Yet,
only sixteen jurisdictions have adopted it. While possession-based
acquisitive prescription could protect some of the good-faith
registrants, it is not always the case. Moreover, the possession-based
acquisitive prescription doctrine as of now usually requires an even
longer prescription period; thus, it is not a substitute for the
registration-based doctrine.
b. Registration-Based, with Bad Faith and Apparent Title
As a general matter, this article is in favor of abolishing
acquisitive prescription for bad-faith possessors altogether for
efficiency reasons. 91 Portugal, for example, allows bad-faith
registrants with title, after a longer period, to permanently become
owners. 92 The explicit accommodation of bad-faith, registrationbased acquisitive prescription is puzzling. Given that registrants
have title, they must know the seller, at least at one point in time.
Once they are aware of the defect, should property law encourage
91
That is, this Article does not take into account other first-order values, such
as redistribution of wealth. For a more adverse possessor-friendly law on
redistribution grounds, see PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 10, at 148-52.
92
CÓDIGO CIVIL [Civil Code] art. 1294 (Port.).
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registrants to wait for the prescription period to pass? Probably not,
because bad-faith registrants know that their legal ownership is
precarious and thus would refrain from investing on the land. If
bad-faith registrants cannot prescriptively acquire ownership, nor
will they be compensated for their improvement, they are likely to
reach out to erstwhile owners to re-negotiate at the earliest time,
either getting their money back or securing their ownership through
a new agreement, both eliminating uncertainty.
Bad-faith
registrants’ conscious decision not to bargain93 will make us doubt
whether they value the land more than erstwhile owners.94
Of course, good and bad faith are not given—possessors who fail
to actively verify title would be considered good-faith.95 Here, as in
other property doctrines such as the good-faith purchase and
specificatio, 96 bad faith should mean “know or should have
known,”97 rather than being coterminous with “know.” A registrant
who is simply ignorant of the title defect but could have easily
figured it out should be classified as bad-faith.
Such an
interpretation of bad faith should be able to filter out most
intentionally innocent registrants. Debating whether a possessor is
good- or bad-faith in court can increase litigation cost. 98 Even
though the litigation cost of proving good or bad faith is a social cost,
underinvestment during the limbo of the prescription period would
be a social cost as well. Moreover, presuming good or bad faith in
practice resolves (or kills) much of the evidentiary issues and keeps
93
See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession,
79 NW. U.L. REV. 1122, 1135 (1985).
94
Professor Richard Epstein puts it more colorfully: bad faith possessors “are
both bad people in the individual cases and a menace in the future . . .”. See Epstein,
supra note 65, at 686.
95
See Jeong-Yoo Kim, Good-Faith Error and Intentional Trespassing in Adverse
Possession, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (2004).
96
See Yun-chien Chang, The Good-Faith Purchase Doctrine in 247 Jurisdictions, 9
EUR. PROP. L.J. 133, 136 (2020); Yun-chien Chang, An Economic and Comparative
Analysis of Specificatio (the Accession Doctrine), 39 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 225 (2015).
97
All doctrines that incorporate the element of good faith have the same
problem of requiring and assessing optimal good faith. The good faith purchase
doctrine is a prime example and shares the same concern. See Giuseppe DariMattiacci & Carmine Guerriero, Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation
in Bona Fide Purchase Rules, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 543, 552-53 (2015); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes over the Ownership of
Works of Art and Other Collectibles, in ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS: SELECTED ESSAYS 177
(Victor Ginsburgh & Pierre-Michel Menger eds., 1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Strict
Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2129 (2012).
98
See Ben Depoorter, Adverse Possession, in PROPERTY LAW AND ECONOMICS 183,
186 (Boudewijn Bouckaert ed., 2010).
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litigation costs in check. 99 If title defects are not attributable to
registrants, it seems right to me that they should be presumed good
faith, while the presumption of bad faith is right when title defects
are attributable to registrants.
The draft Restatement of the Law Fourth, Property, is going in
another direction. Good faith and bad faith will not be distinguished
in the adverse possession doctrine, but such a consideration is
deferred to the law of equity and the law of restitution. In terms of
results, bad-faith adverse possessors are still unlikely to become
owners simply after the passage of time.100 For the many studied
jurisdictions that do not have a separate equity system, this
approach does not fit into their civil code structure. To be sure, there
are many general principles in civil codes, and unjust enrichment is
often an integral part as well. Not all civil-law courts are willing or
able to carve out bad-faith adverse possession from existing general
principles or the law of unjust enrichment.101 If the case against badfaith adverse possessors is strong enough, it is more desirable for
lawmakers in countries without the equity tradition to explicitly
exclude bad-faith possessors and registrants from getting
ownership.102
c. Possession-based, with Good Faith and Apparent Title
Protecting good-faith possessors with title, like protecting those
in a registration-based system, can be well justified. These regimes
are a “safety valve”103 for the usually rigid formality requirement in
real estate transactions. In jurisdictions with a recording rather than
registration-of-right system, a buyer may have commissioned
99
One more reliable proxy is to use adverse possessors’ paying taxes to
presume good faith.
100
See Richard H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH.
U.L.Q. 331 (1983). See the debate surrounding Helmholz’s claim in Lovett, supra
note 78; PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 10, at 250–51 n.34.
101
At the very least, civil law courts should draw on general principles such
as abuse of right to thwart certain bad-faith possessors from becoming legal owners.
Professor Henry Smith calls this approach meta-law. See Smith, supra note 12.
102
The preceding logic applies to bad-faith possessors with title but who fail
to register it.
103
See Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2128–29 (2009) (arguing that because the surveying system is
subject to mistakes, a traditional equitable analysis achieves more favorable results
than a pure liability-rule regime).
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professional title searching but still failed to uncover a broken chain
of title. A possession-based regime with the apparent title
requirement is a valuable safety valve for a genuine, faultless
purchaser.104
The case for this type of acquisitive prescription is a little weaker
than the registration-based counterpart because registration of title
is not required. As shown in Table 2, ten studied jurisdictions
require title in their possession-based regimes. They do not enact a
registration-based system, perhaps because lawmakers also have
opted for a “declaratory” registration;105 hence, lawmakers do not
expect transacting parties to always register their conveyance.
Indeed, among the ten jurisdictions, five are former French colonies
that follow the original 1804 French Civil Code in enabling a sale
contract itself to convey land ownership. According to World
Bank’s 2016 Doing Business data,106 registries in these five countries
do not deliver a legally binding document to prove ownership. With
weak registries, it is pointless to require title registration. In three
other countries, Guatemala, Luxembourg, 107 and Mauritius,
registration has opposability effects, and only Guatemala’s registry
provides a legally binding document to prove ownership. Scotland
also belongs to this group, but it also adopts registration-based
acquisitive prescription. These examples suggest that a possessionbased regime makes sense as a safety valve for purchasers. Only
Latvia’s (Art. 1024) choice of this system over a registration-based
system cannot be explained by the aforementioned reason.108

104
Title insurance will not disappear, because before the statute of limitations
runs, buyers qua possessors are not protected by the acquisitive prescription
regime. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse
Possession, 100 NW. L. REV. 1037, 1083 (2006). On the other hand, title insurance is
not a panacea, as it is unlikely to cover all the expected buyers’ side profits.
105
If registration is declaratory, a transfer of ownership is opposable to third
parties only after registration. Nonetheless, registration is not necessary for binding
parties to a sale contract. See SCHMID & HERTEL, supra note 17, at 33.
106
Whether registries deliver legally binding documents to prove ownership
was surveyed by the World Bank and released in November 2016 in the
“Transparency of information index.” Historical Dataset with Scores, WORLD BANK
(2020),
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/excel/db2020/Hi
storical-data---COMPLETE-dataset-with-scores.xlsx (last visited Feb. 26, 2022)
(“Transparency of information index (0-6)” can be found in column BX).
107
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE (EUI), REAL PROPERTY AND PROCEDURE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 37 (2005).
108
CIVILIKUMS [CIVIL LAW] art. 1024.
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Five countries allow only good-faith possessors to acquisitively
prescribe ownership, and good-faith possessors with title enjoy a
shorter prescription period. Similarly, twenty-seven countries allow
both good- and bad-faith possessors to acquisitively prescribe
ownership, and the good-faith ones with title enjoy a shorter
prescription period. As explained above, favorable treatment to
possessors with title makes sense. Nonetheless, even in this case,
the prescription periods—five, seven, ten, or twenty years—appear
to be too long. Why don’t these thirty-two jurisdictions have title
registration as a necessary condition? Unreported tables show that
the choice of at least half of the jurisdictions can be explained in the
same way above (registries do not issue legally binding documents
to prove ownership and/or registration is not constitutive). Still,
several countries could better ensure that acquisitive prescription is
used wisely if possessors have to register their title.
Registration types and how well registries function lead to
different efficiency judgment on which acquisitive prescription
regimes are better. In a country with constitutive registration and a
well-functioning registry, its possession-based regime should be
upgraded to a registration-based one, with good faith, apparent title,
and its registration required. In a country with a dysfunctional
registry, a possession-based regime may be locally efficient. In
between are countries with well-functioning registries plus
declaratory registration, discussed above. These countries did not
choose to induce all real estate transactions to channel through
registries and do not always explicitly make registration opposable
to third parties. It is reasonable for lawmakers in these countries to
choose to protect buyers who have title but do not register by a
possession-based acquisitive prescription regime with the title
requirement.

d. Adverse Possession: Possession-based, without Apparent Title
From an economic standpoint, at the most general level, any
acquisitive prescription regime, especially a possession-based one
without any title requirement, has to be justified in the following
ways. First, because adverse possessors value the land in question
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more than erstwhile owners do, 109 an acquisitive prescription
regime that awards ownership to possessors increases allocative
efficiency. 110 Second, an acquisitive prescription regime can be
sustained with low institution cost. The institution cost incurred by
possessors (who want to utilize the land), erstwhile owners (who
need to fend off trespassers), and third parties (who are potential
purchasers of land from either adverse possessors or erstwhile
owners) all have to be taken into account. As compared to
registration-based regimes and possession-based regimes with title
requirements, possession-based regimes without title requirements
are more difficult to justify. The three sub-sections below thus adopt
this more structured framework to guide the analysis. Sub-section
1 gauges the costs and benefits of possession-based regimes without
title requirements in a country with well-functioning recording
systems. The United States is the prime example. 111 Sub-section 2
explores those costs in a country with well-functioning registrationof-right systems. Germany and Taiwan are the shadow examples.112
Sub-section 3 discusses countries with dysfunctional registration or
recording systems.
i.

In Recording Systems
1. Allocative Efficiency

Do adverse possessors always value the land more than
erstwhile owners? Apparently, it is unlikely that either adverse
possessors are always the higher valuer or erstwhile owners are
always the higher valuer. If neither party has legal ownership and
a decision-maker is thus choosing between two of equal footing,
perhaps a “more likely than not” standard is sufficient to favor one
109
See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1113 (2011); Sally
Brown Richardson, Abandonment and Adverse Possession, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1385, 1403
(2015); JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT,
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 141 (2006). Cf. Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse
Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47, 67-70 (2010)
(from agenda-setting vacancy to an individual with agenda-setting authority).
110
See Fennell, supra note 104, at 1064.
111
See BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF IMPERSONAL
EXCHANGE: THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 44 (2012).
112
See id.; YUN-CHIEN CHANG, WEITSENG CHEN & YING-CHIEH WU, PROPERTY
AND TRUST LAW IN TAIWAN 35 (2017).
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party systematically. Nonetheless, given that erstwhile owners are
legitimate owners and adverse possessors are trespassers to begin
with, one may demand that adverse possessors face a heightened
standard to establish that they are very often higher valuers and thus
justify the acquisitive prescription regime on allocative efficiency
grounds.
Social science evidence that adverse possessors are often the
higher valuers, however, is weak and inconclusive. First, behavioral
law and economics research points out that adverse possessors may
experience an “endowment effect”113 after occupying and using the
land for several years. Psychological studies, however, often do not
distinguish between possession and ownership; thus, it is hard to
tell whether the endowment effect comes from possession or
ownership. 114 Those that do try to tease out the effect from
possession versus ownership find inconsistent results.115 Moreover,
ownership is “imputed” in the lab, while possession is “felt”; thus,
lab experiments, due to their constraint on this issue, may never
provide strong enough evidence to pass the heightened standard.
Finally, even if adverse possessors all experience strong endowment
effects, they do not necessarily value the things more than the
erstwhile owners, who had experienced endowment effects when
they first acquired the things in question.
If a general case that adverse possessors are usually higher
valuers cannot be made, 116 whether it is the case in a narrower
setting can still be explored. Again, an assessment of allocative
efficiency, in this context, is a comparison of erstwhile owners’
willingness to accept and possessors’ willingness to pay (or,
113
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 288-99 (2011); see also
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 830 (2009) (arguing that
adverse possession honors a person’s psychological attachment).
114
See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, What Behavioral Studies Can Teach Jurists
About Possession and Vice Versa, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 128, 136-37
(Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015).
115
For an overview of the existing literature, see EYAL ZAMIR & DORON
TEICHMAN , BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 209-12 (2018).
116
But cf. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 10, at 129 (noting that when the
distribution of property is extremely skewed, the adverse possessors may be the
higher valuer). This argument of lawbreakers placing higher value on properties
can only justify bad-faith adverse possession but not good-faith adverse possession.
In addition, while this argument is relevant in the adverse possession scenario that
this article focuses on (an illicit possessor occupying another’s land), this argument
is less applicable to the modal adverse possession cases in the United States—
building encroachment—as the two parties in such disputes are neighboring
landowners, and their wealth may not be extremely different.
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equivalently, their economic values). While the former is revealed
in erstwhile owners’ purchase and their refusal to deal at market
value,117 the latter is never revealed. Professor Thomas Merrill has
advocated application of the liability rule, at least when possessors
are bad-faith—that is, possessors have to pay erstwhile owners to
gain ownership118 (no studied jurisdictions adopt anything close to
this). If adverse possessors in particular cases are not willing to pay
market value at the time of the dispute, they are likely lowervaluers. Even if possessors are willing to pay market value, it is still
unclear whether they value the land in question more than erstwhile
owners do. Nevertheless, policy makers can rest assured knowing
that the law is not facilitating a blatantly inefficient transfer.
The indemnification requirement could be criticized as
unnecessary119 if transaction costs are low enough, as the two parties
can bargain with each other to redress any allocative inefficiency.120
This Coasean critique of Merrill’s proposal, however, can be
criticized in at least two ways. First, Professor Ward Farnsworth
argues that animosity between parties generated in litigation is a
deal-breaker.121 Litigating parties will not bargain over the land in
question. Thus, without the liability rule design, evicted adverse
possessors will not become legal owners even when they are higher
valuers. Second, the mechanism design literature in economics has
demonstrated that a two-party bargaining scenario with one party
(an erstwhile owner) owning 100% of the thing in question while the
other party (an adverse possessor) owns 0% will not ensure
117
Landowners may check market prices from time to time and decide
whether to unload their assets. Third parties may also contact them to offer to
purchase the land in question at around market prices.
118
See Merrill, supra note 93, at 1152.
119
See Merrill, supra note 93, at 1151–52 (arguing that indemnification cannot
be justified by allocative efficiency).
120
But if the Coase theorem holds, the law need not re-assign entitlements via
acquisitive prescription.
121
See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment?
A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (1999); Ward Farnsworth,
The Empirical Accuracy and Judicial Use of the Coase Theorem (vel non), in THE ELGAR
COMPANION TO RONALD H. COASE 346 (Claude Menard & Elodie Bertrand eds.,
2016). But see the empirical critique of the Farnsworth idea in Yun-chien Chang &
Chang-Ching Lin, Do Parties Negotiate After Trespass Litigation? An Empirical Study
of Coasean Bargaining (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 1906,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805063
[https://perma.cc/GTN8-6WVD]; Yun-Chien Chang et al., Emotional Bargaining
after Litigation: An Experimental Study of the Coase Theorem (2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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allocative efficiency. 122
Some efficient trades will not be
consummated.
In short, Merrill’s proposal to add an
indemnification requirement increases, but does not ensure,
allocative efficiency.
Professor Lee Anne Fennell has argued that bad-faith adverse
possessors could be (but are not necessarily) “efficient
trespass[ers].” 123 To tease out the true higher valuers, adverse
possessors should demonstrate that market transaction is not
feasible and erstwhile owners are aware of adverse possessors’
occupation and their interest in the things in question.124 As said
above, this article is in general against bad-faith adverse possession,
but I am willing to entertain the idea of “efficient trespass” in
Professor Fennell’s well-confined scenario. 125 Still, one wonders
how many bad-faith adverse possession claims could survive in this
scenario (this is an empirical question). In terms of results, Fennell’s
world (which does not welcome good-faith adverse possession) may
be one without successful adverse possession at all. Moreover, even
if a few cases pass muster, it is doubtful whether the allocative
efficiency gain in these few cases could justify the transaction cost
and information cost incurred by the adverse possession regime (see
Part III.d.i.2.). That is, as compared to a world where there is no
adverse possession allowed, a world with an adverse possession
regime under which only few possessors acquire land ownership
may not produce a net gain.
The only way to tease out whether erstwhile owners or adverse
possessors value property more, according to the mechanism design
literature in economics, is through an internal auction in which only
an erstwhile owner and an adverse possessor, assigned (roughly)
equal shares of ownership of the land in question, participate.126 The
122
See, e.g., Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms
for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265, 265-66 (1983).
123
See Fennell, supra note 104.
124
See Fennell, supra note 104, at 1040-41. See also PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra
note 10, at 148–52.
125
Fennell’s analogy of efficient knowing speeding to bad-faith efficient
trespassing, however, may not be entirely appropriate. Unlike adversely
possessing land, speeding does not involve long-term investment, and the gain
from speeding itself cannot be taken away, while bad-faith trespassers may refrain
from investing as, say, the crops they grow could belong to the erstwhile owners.
126
See Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, Dissolving a
Partnership Efficiently, 55 ECONOMETRICA 615 (1987). For an introduction of the idea
in general, see Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
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design of such an internal auction will induce both parties to bid
honestly, and thus the auction can reveal which party is the higher
valuer, who should get full ownership but have to compensate the
other party.
This proposal, however, begs the question of why adverse
possessors should be awarded (any) ownership. As argued above,
bad-faith adverse possessors should be discouraged. Perhaps goodfaith adverse possessors? Recall that good-faith adverse possessors
here do not have title, and boundary disputes are excluded from
analysis in this article. Hence, good-faith adverse possessors have
to be, on the one hand, very mistaken, and, on the other hand, have
spent reasonable efforts in verification, so that they are not labeled
as “should have known” and thus bad-faith. The set of such goodfaith adverse possessors may be quite small. Hence, this Article
does not advocate awarding adverse possessors fifty percent or so
shares. Without a roughly equal share, an internal auction cannot
work magic in inducing honest bidding and facilitating Pareto
optimal trading. Allocative efficiency cannot be ensured as a result.
The prior literature has also discussed whether erstwhile
owners’ slothfulness should be “penalized” and adverse possessors’
diligence should be rewarded.127 The allocative efficiency aspect of
this argument implies that the latter is the higher valuer, partly
because they develop the land in question. Existing works have
countered that the implicit pro-development mentality behind
adverse possession regimes is not the most environmentally
friendly. 128 Conservation may very well be more valuable than
development.129 Even if adverse possession regimes are re-geared
to serve as a development machine, it is a blunt tool, as landowners
can simply evict possessors without doing any development.130 A
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE
L.J. 1027 (1995). For a proposal to use the internal auction in the good-faith purchase
question, see Yun-chien Chang, 247 Jurisdictions in the World Get the Good-Faith
Purchase Problem Wrong: A New Economic Framework (NYU L. & Econ. Rsch., Paper
No. 19-25, 2019).
127
See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO
U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 37–38 (2010); Merrill, supra note 93, at 1128–31.
128
See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994); Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation:
Expanding Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 292–94
(2006); Stake, supra note 16, at 2433.
129
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73–74
(2004).
130
See Stake, supra note 16, at 2436.
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tax imposed on vacant land may be more effective in promoting
development.
Then again it all boils down to whether
“slothfulness” and “diligence” translate to systematic differences in
economic value.
In sum, no argument is strong enough to explain and justify the
broad adverse possession regime adopted now.
Merrill’s
indemnification requirement improves the regime, but the outcome
may still fail to meet a high-bar standard which requires compelling
evidence that acquisitive prescription will very likely lead to higher
allocative efficiency. Fennell’s reform proposal helps achieve the
goal of allocative efficiency, but in effect is close to getting rid of the
regime altogether.
2. Institution Costs
Acquisitive prescription regimes should minimize information
costs and transaction costs while maintaining the allocative benefits
derived. In net, it is unclear whether a legal system with the adverse
possession regime produces lower information and transaction costs
than one without. The prior literature notes that adverse possession
can clear stale claims, quiet title, and induce information about the
identity of landowners—that is, the possibility of losing ownership
due to adverse possession will force erstwhile owners to sue
possessors, which enables the latter to identify the whereabouts of
passive and absentee owners and negotiate with them. 131 It is
questionable how useful this is. Given the strict conditions of
adverse possession, this regime is unlikely to clear stale claims or
quiet title in many parcels. Rather, only a tiny number of plots
would have a fresh start. Marketable title act, quiet title action and
even rules against perpetuities are more useful in eliminating
ancient interests and reduce information cost regarding who owns
what property rights. It is also questionable (though an empirical
answer is needed) how often a serious potential buyer cannot locate
the current owner, with the help of professional middlemen. In
addition, whether drawing out current owners through the process

131
See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 127, at 37–38; Epstein, supra note 65, at 678;
Merrill, supra note 93, at 1128–31; Jeffry M. Netter, Philip L. Hersch & William D.
Manson, An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
217, 219 (1986).
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of adverse possession is a recipe for successful trades between
adverse possessors and owners is also doubtful.132
Moreover, as existing works already notice, in the United States,
because adverse possessors gain ownership automatically once the
statute of limitations runs, 133 adverse possession itself introduces
unrecorded interests in land and increases information cost. 134
Third-party information cost would be lower, had the law been that
subsequent parties would be bound by adverse possession if an
adverse possessor had brought a quiet title action and recorded the
declaratory judgment. But the draft Restatement of the Law Fourth,
Property, is inclined to take the position that subsequent parties
would not be bound only if an adverse possessor has brought a quiet
title action but failed to record the declaratory judgment. Hence,
third parties who have checked the public records could be
surprised—and legally defeated 135 —by adverse possessors who
have not brought a quiet title action. True, potential buyers who
have done a field trip to the land may be able to identify adverse
possession, but this hinges on real-world cues which are not always
easy to know. In addition, once adverse possessors meet the
requirement for adverse possession and become owners, they are
not required to continue to possess in an open fashion. A field trip
may even be misleading under this type of circumstance. In any
way, this investigation of potential existence of adverse possession
increases information costs across the board—any land could have
been adversely possessed and sellers may have incentives to hide
the information, so all potential buyers have to figure out whether
an adverse possessor is around. Therefore, the adverse possession
doctrine decreases information costs (in one aspect) in a small
number of deals but increases information costs (in another aspect)
in every transaction. This does not seem to be a bargain worth
striking.
Assume that genuine good-faith possessors exist (the draft
Restatement of the Law Fourth, Property, contains many
illustrations, most of which are adapted from real cases, but almost
132
Also, because in fact the adverse possession doctrine in the United States
is used mostly to resolve boundary disputes, it can hardly clear stale claims (as they
still exist in the remainder of the neighbor’s land). Difficulty in identifying a
transacting partner is also not applicable, as the partner literally lives next door.
133
See Klass, supra note 128, at 287 n.14.
134
See Fennell, supra note 104, at 1062-63.
135
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROPERTY § 1.2.2.1 (Am. L. Inst., Preliminary
Draft No. 6, 2019).
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all of which are in the boundary dispute context, not in this context).
Is awarding ownership through adverse possession necessary to
protect them? Put differently, is it necessary to give good-faith
possessors and owners who worry that their ownership may be
void(able) an optimal incentive to invest? I don’t think so. If
acquiring ownership through prescription is a necessary condition,
any substantial prescription period will fail the goal of optimal
investment, because every landowner will think that before the
statute of limitations runs she may lose everything. A strict
construction of continuous possession, where a week of renouncing
possession will re-start the stop watch, is not tailor-made for the
purpose of inducing optimal investment.
Good-faith adverse possessors’ diligence and reliance
interests136 have to be protected, because, ex ante, every landowner
in a recording system will more or less worry about the reliability of
her surveyor’s and lawyer’s reports. Optimal investment and low
transaction cost cannot be achieved if good-faith adverse possessors’
investments cannot be recouped. To do so, the law of equity in
common-law countries and possession-related doctrines in, for
instance, Germany (Art. 996) and Taiwan (Art. 955) can readily take
care of compensating good-faith adverse possessors for their
necessary expenses and the value they have created.137 This kind of
indemnification requirement should suffice to induce adverse
possessors’ optimal investment.
Possession-based acquisitive
prescription, therefore, is neither necessary nor useful for promoting
efficiency in countries with the recording system.
ii. In Registration-of-Right Systems
1. All or Most Real Properties Have Been Registered
In a country with the registration-of-right system, where most, if
not all, land parcels are registered, or at least the land in question is
registered, it is even more difficult to justify possession-based
acquisitive prescription. In terms of allocative efficiency, all the
preceding analysis applies. Moreover, the question of whether there
See Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 13, at 161.
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 996; MÍNFǍ (民法) [Civil
Code] art. 955 (Taiwan).
136
137
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are any genuine good-faith adverse possessors looms larger because
in a registration-of-right system, no matter whether registration has
a constitutive or opposable effect, the most updated right-holding
and right-holder information is easily retrievable in registries. Who
would possess a parcel for twenty years without ever bothering to
check out whether she is registered as its owner? When possessors
do check and realize that they are not the owner, they become badfaith. In addition, in a registration-of-right system, the contained
information likely serves as the basis for levying property taxes. If
everyone else pays their property taxes every year, what kind of
adverse possessors could be unaware of this well-known duty while
still being genuinely good-faith?138
Institution cost rationales are also weaker in a registration-ofright system. First, a registration-of-right system does not have
“stale” claims. Registration is very often constitutive or opposable,
and the realfolium (track index) makes it clear to any party concerned
who owns what. Thus, there is in general little need to quiet title,
not to mention recognizing adverse possession to quiet title.
Besides, adverse possessors do not have to possess in a hostile way
to force erstwhile owners to identify themselves. In some countries,
the former could easily locate the latter via the information saved in
registries. In other countries, registries can be revamped as an
information clearing house—the identity of current owners need not
be revealed (for privacy or other reasons) and registries could relay
potential purchasers’ offers and contact information to current
owners. As the World Bank’s Doing Business data shows (see Table
3), at least in the largest business city, to the extent that the
registration is comprehensive and reliable (which is not always the
case, as shown in Table 4), most jurisdictions have policies that
enable potential adverse possessors to identify current owners.
Table 3: Transparency of Land Ownership Information

138
Some states thus require adverse possessors to have paid taxes during the
prescription period. See Stake, supra note 16, at 2424.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

422

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

Who is able to obtain information on land
ownership at the agency in charge of
immovable property registration in the
largest business city?
Freely accessible by anyone

[Vol. 43:2

Frequency

%

26

18

Anyone who pays the official fee

73

50

Only intermediaries and interested parties

39

27

Only intermediaries (notaries, lawyers, etc.)

3

2

Records are not publicly available

6

4

147

100

Total
Notes:

Source:

N=147. This table includes all jurisdictions that are both coded by this
Article and have available World Bank data. Cuba, Turkmenistan,
Liechtenstein, North Korea, and Monaco are not included in the World
Bank data sources. Louisiana, Macau, and Scotland are sub-national
jurisdictions that are omitted. South Pacific countries are included in
World Bank data sources but are omitted because there is only one holistic
coding of law for all the countries.
The World Bank Doing Business Data “Transparency of information
index” released in November 2016. See WORLD BANK DATA infra Table 4;
supra note 106.

In registration-of-right systems, adverse possession laws can
either require adverse possessors to register their ownership once
the statute of limitations runs or make registration the precondition
for opposability.139 Third parties, therefore, can simply rely on the
information provided by registries and do not have to launch an onsite investigation. With such a regime, adverse possession neither
increases nor decreases information costs for third parties. But that
means adverse possession cannot be justified on the ground of
saving institution costs.

139
Otherwise, the information cost-reducing function of registries will be
discounted. See Stake, supra note 16, at 2442-43; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (8th ed. 2011).
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2. Many Real Properties Have Not Been Registered
In some countries, not all land parcels have been registered.
Lack of complete coverage may be attributable to various reasons,
such as the high costs for registries to survey all parcels. It is thus
hard to have a general discussion as to whether and how registered
and unregistered properties should be treated separately for
economic reasons. Still, a few comments are in order.
First, bad-faith adverse possession in general should be
discouraged.
Second, a citizen with common sense in a country with the
registration-of-right system would more or less know that the
information provided by registries is authoritative and more reliable
than the fact of possession.
Third, only eighteen of the 128 jurisdictions (twelve percent)
with possession-based acquisitive prescription explicitly limit the
object of such acquisitions to unregistered real estate.140 The other
140
Eighteen jurisdictions have a clear rule that acquisitive prescription applies
to unregistered land only: Austria (Art. 1468); Azerbaijan (Art. 178.6), Bahrain (Art.
903 II); Benin (Art. 38); Cyprus; El Salvador (Art. 2244); Iraq (Art. 1158); Israel
(Prescription Law (1958) Art. 5); Jordan (Arts. 1181–1182); Liechtenstein (Art. 34(1));
Lithuania (Art. 4.69); Ontario (Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5, sub. 51(1)); South
Africa; Suriname (Art. 1984); Syria (Art. 197); Taiwan (Arts. 769–770); Turkey (Art.
713); and the United Arab Emirates (Art. 1317). See ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 1468 (Austria); AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLIKASININ
MÜLKI MƏCƏLLƏSI [CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN] art. 178.6 (Azer.);
BI'IISDAR ALQANUN ALMADANII [CIVIL LAW] No. 19 of 2001, art. 903 (Bahr.); Loi 201301 du 14 août 2013 de portant code foncier etdomanial en République du Bénin
[Law 2013-01 of August 14, 2014 on the Land Code and State Property in the
Republic of Benin], art. 38; ANDREAS NEOCLEOUS, INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS LAW 599
(2000); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2247 (El Sal.); Civil Code of 1953,
art. 1158 (Iraq); §5, Prescription Law, 5718-1958, LSI 12 129 (1958), as amended (Isr.);
SACHENRECHT (SR) [Property law] vom 31. art. 34(1) (Liech.); LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS
CIVILINIS KODEKSAS [CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA] bk. 4 art. 69; Land
Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990 c L.5, sub. 51(1) (Can. Ont.); BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [CIVIL CODE]
art. 1984 (Surin.); ALQANUN ALMADANIU ALSAADIR BIALMARSUM ALTASHRIEII RAQM 84
TARIKH 18/5/1949 [THE CIVIL CODE PROMULGATED BY LEGISLATIVE DECREE NO. 84 OF
MAY 18, 1949] art. 197 (Syria); MÍNFǍ (民法) [Civil Code] art. 769-70 (Taiwan);
MEDINI KANUNU [CIVIL LAW] art. 713 (Turk.); Qanun almueamalat almadaniat
lidawlat al'iimarat alearabiat almutahida ()قاﻧون المعاﻣﻼت المﺪﻧية لﺪولة اﻹﻣارات العربية المتحﺪة
[Federal Law No. 5 of 1985 On the Civil Transactions Law of the United Arab
Emirates State] art. 1317. See NEOCLEOUS, supra note 140, at 599 (detailing Cyprus’
law’s exclusive application to unregistered land); VAN DER MERWE, DE WAAL &
MILLER, supra note 16 (detailing the same for South Africa); HASHEM, supra note 26
(translating Jordan Arts. 1181-1182). Taiwan is one of the eighteen jurisdictions, but
Taiwan now has no unregistered land. Consequently, while the Taiwanese Civil
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110 jurisdictions, if in fact allowing adverse possession over
registered land, should have second thoughts on the underlying
justification. A registration-of-right system is expensive—a wellfunctioning one especially so. Limiting adverse possession to
unregistered land only would hardly increase anyone’s transaction
cost and information cost by much, as anyone could easily check
with low cost and get authoritative answers on whether she owns
the land she possesses.
3.

Dysfunctional Registries

Many countries’ registries, however, are dysfunctional. There
are 120 jurisdictions that: (1) are surveyed in this article; (2) are
surveyed by the World Bank Doing Business Data; and (3) have any
type of acquisitive prescription defined above. Table 4 shows how
they fare in keeping track of land right information. Apparently, the
level of functionality of these registries varies. But roughly a quarter
to a third of these jurisdictions have arguably dysfunctional
registries.141
In these jurisdictions, registration-based acquisitive prescription
does not make sense, as registration information is not reliable and
is incomplete. A registration-based regime may even spawn
corruption, as strategic persons make their ways into registries
through bribery.
By contrast, possession-based acquisitive prescription may at
least reduce information cost. In jurisdictions with well-functioning
registries, possession-based regimes are used to replace current
owners with adverse possessors. In those with dysfunctional
registries, possession-based regimes instead identify who real
owners are.142 Think of two parties in such a jurisdiction dispute in
Code has rules for adverse possession of land ownership, adverse possessors are
doomed to fail.
141
I identify dysfunctional registries in the following way. There are eight
questions in Table 4. If the answer to any question is yes, it is coded as 1; if no, 0.
This “dysfunctional registry” index ranges from 0 to 8. Twenty-two percent of the
121 studied countries have the index value of 0 or 1, and thirty-seven percent of
them have the index value of 0, 1, or 2. These registries are arguably dysfunctional.
Only twenty-three percent of the 121 studied countries have the index value of 5 or
larger.
142
As Erica Field has found, in Peru, receiving a legal property title led to a
48% decrease in the fraction of households that locate entrepreneurial activities
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court, each claiming to be the legal owner: one party has occupied
the land for ten or fifteen years and behaved like an owner. The
other party has been absent but presents documents issued by
registries or registry records that suggest that she is the owner. Here
the case for favoring the former is stronger, as there are many ways
in which the records or documents are unreliable, while peaceful
and continuous possession for many years strongly suggests that the
community (which is generally more close-knit in countries with
dysfunctional registries) accepts the possessor as the owner. Given
that land transaction markets are not that efficient, due to the
dysfunctional registries, actual use is more strongly correlated with
higher-valuing. Information and transaction costs in general will
not become higher because of recognizing ownership acquired
through prescription, because actual possession in physical space
may be what transacting parties rely on.143
In these jurisdictions, adverse possessors are more likely to be
good-faith than elsewhere. A good-faith adverse possession regime
will not be pointless. Whether bad-faith adverse possession should
be allowed is a more difficult question. Here, someone knows that
she is not the owner of a plot she is interested in cultivating or
developing. Due to the dire situation of the registry, she simply
cannot find the legal owner. Even so, a possession-based regime
with a reasonable prescription period still creates under-investment.
As argued above, optimal investment can be attained by
compensating possessors with the necessary expenses and value
created.
It can be imagined that in most countries, such
compensation for bad-faith possessors is less generous than goodfaith possessors. Here, a Fennell-proposal-like regime may be
established: bad-faith possessors should notify registries and give
public notice of their adverse possession. Erstwhile owners’
inside the home and a thirty-six percent reduction in the fraction of households that
report keeping individuals at home to protect property. That is, before registration
is introduced and enforced, possession was considered necessary to protect
properties. See Erica Field, Property Rights, Community Public Goods, and Household
Time Allocation in Urban Squatter Communities: Evidence from Peru, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 837, 841-42 (2004).
143
An anecdote is in order here. I hired an LL.M. student from Colombia
when I visited Cornell Law School a few years ago. She informed me that the
registry in Columbia is not functioning very well. Legal owners’ property rights
could be transferred without their authorization and then registered. To prevent
this from happening, many landowners put up huge signs in front of their houses,
stating that “this property is NOT for sale, for lease, or for any type of transfer.”
She was shocked when I told her that no developed countries have this
phenomenon.
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knowledge should probably not be required. The upshot for these
bad-faith possessors is not landownership for free, but equal
treatment as good-faith ones when it comes to compensation for
necessary expenses and created value.
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Table 4: Functioning of Registries
Surveyed Results
Registered all private land in the
largest business city†
Registered all private land†
Mapped all private land†
Mapped all private land in the
largest business city†
Cost of registering property is
<5% of the property value*
Law requires all property sale
transactions be registered at
immovable property registry to
make them opposable to third
parties.‡
A specific compensation
mechanism exists to cover losses
incurred by parties who have
engaged in good faith in property
transaction based on erroneous
information certified by an
immovable property registry? ‡
Immovable property registries
commit to delivering a legally
binding document that proves
property ownership within a
specific time frame?**
Notes:

Source:

Number of
% of
Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions
55
45
30
36
64

24
29
52

63

52

116

94

35

29

64

52

N=123, unless otherwise stated. Cuba, Turkmenistan, Liechtenstein,
North Korea, and Monaco are not included in World Bank data sources.
United States states, Ontario, Quebec, Macau, and Scotland are omitted
sub-national jurisdictions.
World Bank Doing Business Data. * is from Registering Property; † is from
the Geographic Coverage Index. ‡ is from Land Dispute Resolution Index.
** is from the Transparency of Information Index. The 2016 data was used.
See supra note 106.
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e. Registration-Based, Without Apparent Title
A number of countries adopt registration-based acquisitive
prescription without the apparent title requirement. I would
imagine that, at least in the case of Germany, Switzerland, and South
Korea, buyers without title can hardly get their names into
registries.144 That is, registrants who need acquisitive prescription
are most likely to have title. Indeed, it is difficult to come up with a
concrete example where long-term possessors whose names are
recorded in registries as owners do not have title. Rare cases may
arise due to crazy mistakes, but this may be better dealt with by a
land registration compensation fund used in the Torrens version of
the registration-of-right system (Germany already adopts this). The
fund comes from fees levied along with each registered transaction,
so it is like mandatory insurance among landowners.
A
compensation fund, but not acquisitive prescription, will not disrupt
the normal operation of property law and everyday real estate
transactions.

144
Searching from the two most comprehensive German Civil Code
commentaries, the Münchener Kommentar and the Staudinger Kommentar, one
will find that, among the five cases listed in these commentaries, decided by a
German federal court or state court according to § 900 of the German Civil Code
(regarding registration-based acquisitive prescription), four involve wrongful
registration that took place in the nineteenth century. See Bayerisches Oberstes
Landesgericht [BayObLG] [Bavarian Higher Regional Court] Apr. 12, 1979, 1979
Entscheidungen des Bayerischen Oberstes Landesgerichts in Zivilsachen
[BayObLGZ] 104 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June
30, 1971, Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht [MDR] 915 (1971) (Ger.); BGH, Oct. 29,
1971,
V
ZR
122/68,
rechtsanwalt-krau.eu,
https://rechtsanwaltkrau.de/urteilenotarwesen/bgh-urteil-vom-29-oktober-1971-v-zr-122-68
[https://perma.cc/HK86-4JHV]; Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf [OLG Düsseldorf]
[Higher State Court Düsseldorf] Nov. 8, 1995, Mitteilungen der Rheinischen
Notarkammer [MittRhNotK] 223 (1996) (Ger.); CHRISTIAN PICKER & SEBASTIAN
HERRLER, J. VON STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN BUCH 3: SACHENRECHT §§ 889–902, at § 900
BGB margin no. 7, 14 (2019). The other case — Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG
Hamm] [Higher State Court Hamm] May 11, 2011, Der Deutsche Rechtspfleger
[Rpfleger] 600 (2011) (Ger.)—involves one heir becoming registrant pursuant to a
forged will. The will only became known as forged more than thirty years after the
testator died. REINHARD GAIER ET AL., MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH: BGB BAND 7: SACHENRECHT §§ 854–1296, at § 900 margin no. 3 (7th ed.
2017).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In modern times, efficient acquisitive prescription regimes are
very different from what most countries have enacted. In countries
with well-functioning registration-of-right systems, a registrationbased regime is warranted. Good faith, apparent title, and
registration of title should be required, but not possession. The
prescription period should be shorter than that currently in place.
Given that boundary disputes can be resolved in a separate doctrine,
a possession-based regime is unnecessary.
As compared to countries with well-functioning registration-ofright systems, countries with reliable recording systems are more
likely to have genuine good-faith adverse possessors.
A
registration-based system that requires good faith, apparent title,
and its recordation is also warranted. A possession-based regime is
unnecessary and counter-productive.
In countries with dysfunctional registries, requirements of
registration of title may not be ideal, as even serious real estate
transacting parties may not have checked the registry or may treat
registration as unnecessary. Good faith, however, should still be a
necessary condition. Possession-based acquisitive prescription may
be warranted in these countries, because ownership information
cannot be reliably retrieved anywhere. Genuine good-faith adverse
possessors without title could very well believe that they are
owners, and they cannot be easily disproved.
Good-faith,
continuous possession should be required.
Good-faith adverse possessors, who neither know nor should
have known that they lacked title but have failed to register or
record their (apparent) title, may appear sympathetic to some. This
article, however, contends that there is no strong (or even weak)
efficiency reason to award ownership for free simply because they
are good-faith and in possession. In most studied countries, the law
of equity or unjust enrichment doctrines are sufficient to protect
these faultless adverse possessors.
Finland and Costa Rica have acquisitive prescription regimes
that are closest to efficiency for countries with well-functioning
registries. They both have registration-based systems that only
allow good-faith registrants who have registered their apparent title
for a certain number of years. In addition, neither allows acquisitive
prescription solely based on possession, without good-faith
registration of apparent title. Their doctrinal requirements are not
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perfect, as possession, in addition to registration, is still required,
and the prescription period is arguably too long. According to the
World Bank’s Doing Business Report data, Costa Rica’s registries are
not of the highest quality, but they are in the second quartile.
Whether its nearly efficient law lives up to its promise depends on
how registries work on the ground. One of the contributions of this
article is to call attention to the fact that how registries work affects
the efficiency level of private law doctrines. A number of countries
that are in the lowest quartile of the Doing Business ranking have
acquisitive prescription rules that are unsuitable given their
dysfunctional registries. If all of them could become like Finland,
with well-functioning registries and efficient laws, that would be
great. But before developmental miracles take place, acquisitive
prescription doctrine should be adjusted to the reality of registries
as they currently exist.
Professor Richard Epstein has commented in the adverse
possession context that “protection of the guilty is not an end in
itself, but the inevitable and necessary price paid in discharging the
primary function of protecting those with proper title.” 145 This
paper suggests that all countries can improve their laws and thus
reduce the “price . . . of protecting those with proper title.”

145

See Epstein, supra note 65, at 678.
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Figure 1: Adoption of Registration- and Possession-based Acquisitive
Prescription
a. Shaded version

b. Multi-colored version

Notes:

156 studied jurisdictions are included in the graphs. “No acquisitive
prescription” means that no acquisitive prescription rule is found in the
jurisdiction. “Registration-based” means that the jurisdiction only adopts
registration-based acquisitive prescription. “Possession-based” means
that the jurisdiction only adopts possession-based acquisitive
prescription. “Both” means that the jurisdiction adopts both registrationand possession-based acquisitive prescription.
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Figure 2: Typology of Possession-based Acquisitive Prescription
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It is unclear whether there is unregistered land in the countries in the
“unregistered title irrelevant” group. The civil codes inform that there is
registered land, and the ordinary course is registration-based acquisitive
prescription. This is an expanded classification based on Table 2. The
“(Un)registered land” in the plot includes both unregistered land and
registered land.
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